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ARTICLES
Fair Circumvention
Timothy K Armstrongt
1. INTRODUCTION
When copyrighted works are published in digital form,
publishers may seek to prevent copyright infringements by embedding
technological protections into the published content. Publishers have a
statutory incentive to deploy such technological protection measures
(commonly referred to as "digital rights management" or "DRM"
systems), for if they do, they may avail themselves of the protections of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA").' The DMCA
forbids circumventing, or trafficking in devices that circumvent,
technological measures that protect copyrighted works.2 This statutory
prohibition on circumventing technological protection measures supplies
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2 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(A), (a)(2), (b)(1) (2006). See infra notes 17-32 and
accompanying text. Such legal protections against circumvention are conventionally believed to be
necessary because of the impossibility of engineering technological protection measures that are
strong enough to withstand attack by sophisticated users in all cases. See, e.g., Competition,
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rights holders with an additional cause of action that they may elect to
pursue instead of, or in addition to, the ordinary remedies for copyright
infringement.3
In a number of recent cases, however, courts have permitted
defendants to circumvent DRM measures or to traffic in circumvention
devices, finding no violation of the DMCA.4 The courts in these cases
offered a number of reasons for rejecting the plaintiffs' claims, including
(1) that the technological subject matter of the parties' dispute was not
within the scope of the DMCA; (2) that plaintiffs were attempting to
apply the DMCA in circumstances not contemplated by Congress at the
time it passed the statute; (3) that the plaintiffs were abusing the DMCA
as a means of gaining improper advantage over a competitor in the
marketplace; and (4) that the plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate
an underlying act of copyright infringement by the defendant as a
necessary element of any DMCA claim. The first two of these arguments
rest on inferences and suppositions about legislative intent in the face of
minimally illuminating statutory text. The latter two are essentially
policy arguments that, whatever their persuasive appeal, are even less
readily grounded in the language of the DMCA as passed.
These recent decisions gain persuasive force, however, if
contextualized within the long history of judge-made exceptions to the
general provisions of federal copyright law. The common-law doctrine of
fair use, for example, began-and, even after receiving express statutory
recognition in the Copyright Act of 1976, 5 continues to evolve-as a
judge-made exception to the statutory exclusive rights of copyright
holders.6 So viewed, recent decisions may be creating what amounts to a
judge-made exception to the liability rules of the DMCA-what is in
3 The causes of action are not, however, coextensive. To be sure, the DMCA's anti-
circumvention rule applies only to copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (prohibiting
circumvention of "a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
this title," that is, a copyrighted work); Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A), (B), (C) (employing similar language in
terms prohibiting trafficking in circumvention devices); Id. § 1201(b)(l)(A), (B), (C) (employing
similar language in terms prohibiting trafficking in devices that circumvent copyright protections).
Thus, neither a copyright infringement claim nor a claim alleging violation of the DMCA may be
premised upon a user's accessing a work in the public domain. Cf. Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v.
WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003) (embedding public domain data in copyrighted
software program gave rise to no claim for copyright infringement against party who sought only to
copy the raw data itself). Nevertheless, even actions that do not constitute copyright infringement
may run afoul of the DMCA's anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions. To take only one
obvious example, merely distributing a circumvention tool suffices on its face to violate § 1201(a)(2)
irrespective of whether that tool is ever actually employed in a manner that results in copyright
infringement.
4 See, e.g., Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 431
F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (permission to copy plaintiffs software was implicit in the licensing
agreement); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(finding no proof of connection between the circumvention device and the protections afforded by
copyright law); Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004)
(Copyright Act provided implied authorization for users to copy unencrypted program code). See
infra Part 11.B.2.
5 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
6 See infra notes 230-244 and accompanying text.
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substance, even if it has not been so labeled by the courts, an emerging
doctrine of "fair circumvention."
My aims herein are both descriptive and normative. As to the
former, I believe that the reference to an emerging judge-made common
law of fair circumvention more accurately describes what the courts are
doing in fact when confronted with cases that test the limits of the
statutory ban on circumventing or trafficking in circumvention devices.
To decide DMCA disputes, the courts are borrowing-sometimes
expressly, sometimes not-from copyright law principles, including fair
use. As to the latter, I conclude that further development of legal doctrine
in this area ought to rest on the forthright acknowledgment and evolution
of an express judge-made "fair circumvention" exception to the DMCA
through the ordinary means of case-by-case adjudication. As I will
discuss below, acknowledging the link between the existing fair use
doctrine and the emerging "fair circumvention" doctrine would offer a
far more robust analytical toolset than exists under the courts' current
approach, which involves divining (or, more accurately, imputing)
legislative intent in the face of statutory silence. Indeed, several of the
factors the courts have seized upon as most salient, such as the nature of
the underlying expressive work and the threat of economic harm to the
plaintiff, are as clearly encompassed within the historical contours of
copyright's fair use doctrine as they are detached from the actual
statutory text of the DMCA.
An analytical caveat is in order, however: it is not my contention
that the courts have imported copyright's fair use exception wholesale
into the DMCA. Although the statute states Congress's intention to
preserve fair use,7 the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA make
no express exceptions for fair uses,8 and some courts have rejected the
notion that a party accused of a DMCA violation may interpose a fair use
defense.9 Although some language in more recent court decisions is more
hospitable to the possibility that a fair use defense may exist in the
DMCA context,"° no court has yet gone so far as to hold that
circumventing a technological protection measure is permissible under
the DMCA in order to make a fair use of the underlying copyrighted
work." My contention, rather, is that courts are borrowing (and should
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (c)(1), discussed infra notes 29, 62-65 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
148 U. PA. L. REv. 673, 727-39 (2000) (demonstrating that DMCA's purported safeguards for users
fail to accommodate existing fair use doctrine); id. at 739 ("The result of these juxtapositions seems
to be a conscious contraction of user rights.").
9 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d 294, 321-24
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (analyzing the doctrine of fair use), affid sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). See infra Part lI.B. 1.
10 See, e.g., infra note 153 and accompanying text.
I I have previously suggested that such a decision would represent only a modest
extension of currently existing doctrine and would be potentially desirable insofar as it would
eliminate the discrepancy that presently exists between the extent of lawful fair uses of works that
2008]
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borrow) factors and criteria that have developed under fair use en route
to creating what I have labeled a separate doctrine of "fair
circumvention" under the DMCA. Continued borrowing of the same sort
may, in time, blur or even eliminate the distinction that presently exists
between the scope of copyright's fair use exception and the narrower, but
growing, DMCA exception for fair circumvention. The fact that the
borrowing is as yet incomplete, however, should not obscure the
substantial amount that has already occurred or preclude further
expansions of the fair circumvention doctrine in the future as an ordinary
adjunct of the courts' common-law powers to interpret and apply federal
copyright law.
Part II of this Article briefly surveys the enactment and text of
the DMCA before turning to a detailed consideration of several cases
that have given the statute either a conspicuously broad, or a
conspicuously narrow, reading. My review suggests that courts on both
sides of the divide over the proper reading of the DMCA are issuing
opinions that are difficult to square with the statutory text they purport to
construe. Because the text alone appears inadequate to explain the actual
results in DMCA cases, the inquiry expands in Part HI of this Article to
consider whether other principles can be invoked to support the courts'
decisionmaking. My principal conclusions here are that (1) courts may,
and properly should, draw upon the broader corpus of federal copyright
law to illuminate the meaning of the DMCA; (2) partly for historical
reasons and partly because of the particular terms of the copyright
statutes, federal copyright law leaves a comparatively broad domain
available for judicial policymaking; and (3) the development of
copyright's fair use doctrine provides a useful model for the courts to
follow in crafting exceptions to liability under the DMCA. This analysis
also suggests that one of the criticisms leveled against some of the courts
in DMCA cases-to wit, that the courts are substituting their own policy
preferences for Congress's-is ill-founded in view of the courts'
prominent historical role in the development of copyright law. Part IV
seeks to guide further judicial development of the emerging fair
circumvention doctrine by analogizing, first, to principles of fair use, and
second, to policy distinctions that have been made in the DMCA cases to
date. The goal here is to suggest that the courts should make explicit a
debate that is currently occurring sotto voce under the surface of their
DMCA opinions. To foster development of a coherent body of doctrine
are protected by DRM mechanisms and those that are not. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights
Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 49, 114-16 (2006). As suggested
in the remainder of this paragraph, however, my goal in this Article is somewhat broader and is not
limited to ensuring adequate protection for fair use of copyrighted works that exist in digital form.
Cf., e.g., Robert D. Denicola, Access Controls, Rights Protection, and Circumvention: Interpreting
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to Preserve Noninfringing Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 209,
220-32 (2008) (arguing that courts should interpret the DMCA with specific focus on preserving fair
uses); YiJun Tian, Problems of Anti-Circumvention Rules in the DMCA & More Heterogenous
Solutions, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 749, 779-81 (2005) (same).
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under the DMCA, the courts should engage in a forthright balancing of
the interests at stake in DMCA cases. The courts should not discount
copyright holders' interests in protecting their works, nor knowledgeable
consumers' interests in making ordinary uses of lawfully acquired
electronics products, but should simply make explicit the factors they
employ in declaring one or the other set of interests to predominate in a
given case.
11. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE DMCA
Because the courts in DMCA cases have declared repeatedly that
their decisions rest solely on a consideration of the statute's literal text, it
is pertinent to begin by reviewing the circumstances that led Congress to
enact the statute and the language it selected to effectuate its intent. The
sections that follow will summarize the background and text of the
statute's anti-circumvention provisions before turning to a critical review
of some of the key cases that have arisen under the DMCA to date.
A. Statutory Background
In 1996, at the urging of the Clinton Administration,12 the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") promulgated two new
treaties dealing, among other issues, with what was perceived as a
growing threat of copyright infringement in the digital arena. The treaties
proposed to authorize content owners to deploy technological measures
that could effectively prevent such infringements from occurring by
limiting users' practical ability to access or copy the protected works,
except upon terms specified by the content owners. It was broadly
understood, however, that such access and copying controls could never
be designed to be perfectly effective in all circumstances-sufficiently
sophisticated users could circumvent the protections and access or copy
the work. 3 To forestall this outcome, the 1996 WIPO treaties required
12 A three-year study by a White House working group culminated in the 1995
publication of Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure, known as the
"White Paper." BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(1995) [hereinafter "White Paper"], available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf.
The White Paper recommended that Congress adopt new legislation
to prohibit the importation, manufacture or distribution of any device ... the primary
purpose or effect of which is to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or otherwise
circumvent, without authority of the copyright owner or the law, any process, treatment,
mechanism or system which prevents or inhibits the violation of any of the exclusive
rights under Section 106 [of the Copyright Act].
Id. at 230. When initial efforts to adopt legislation enacting the White Paper's recommendations
encountered resistance in Congress, however, the Administration turned to the WIPO process
instead. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 122-30 (2001).
13 See supra note 2.
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signatory nations to adopt new legislation punishing circumvention of
access and copy control technologies.
First, Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty required as
follows:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are
used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty
or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which
are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.
14
The contemporaneous WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
imposed a similar obligation, directing in Article 18 as follows:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are
used by performers or producers of phonograms in connection with the exercise
of their rights under this Treaty and that restrict acts, in respect of their
performances or phonograms, which are not authorized by the performers or
the producers of phonograms concerned or permitted by law.'
5
Title I of the DMCA, captioned the "WIPO Copyright and Performances
and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act of 1998," was enacted to
implement both of these treaty requirements.
16
The relevant provisions of the DMCA define three distinct
offenses, one of which forbids circumvention of a technological measure
while the other two forbid trafficking in circumvention devices. The
statute's anti-circumvention provision provides that: "No person shall
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title."' 7 The statute's two anti-trafficking
provisions are each directed against different types of prohibited devices.
The DMCA first forbids the making of or trafficking in devices that
circumvent the same sort of access controls that are the subject of the
anti-circumvention clause:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that-
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title;
14 WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-17, 2186
U.N.T.S. 121.
15 WIPO Performances & Phonograms Treaty, art. 18, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203.
16 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, tit. I, § 101, 112 Stat. 2860,
2861 (1998).
17 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that
person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title.'
8
The other provision forbids making or trafficking in devices that
circumvent copy control technologies:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that-
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a
work or a portion thereof;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than to circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure
that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in
a work or a portion thereof; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that
person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing
protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a
portion thereof.19
As drafted, there is a certain lack of parallelism in the statute: the
provision forbidding trafficking in copy control circumvention devices is
not matched, as the access control trafficking provision is, by a separate
clause outlawing the use of such a device, although this is perhaps
explainable by the fact that circumventing a copy control measure may
be separately punishable as copyright infringement.2"
The DMCA provided definitions of two of the key phrases
employed in the statute's liability provisions. First, Congress defined
what it meant by "circumvention":
[T]o "circumvent a technological measure" means to descramble a scrambled
work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove,
18 Id. § 1201(a)(2) (emphasis added).
19 Id. § 1201(b)(1) (emphasis added).
20 See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1195 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (quoting S. Rep. No. 105-90, at 12 (1998)). This is not, of course, to say that copyright
liability necessarily follows any time a copy control mechanism is circumvented; the courts would
be left in each such case to determine whether the circumvention was excused under other provisions
of copyright law, such as fair use. See, e.g., Michael Landau, Has the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act Really Created a New Exclusive Right of Access?: Attempting to Reach a Balance Between
Users' and Content Providers' Rights, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 277, 288 & nn.52-53 (2001).
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deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the
copyright owner .... 21
Congress next provided an explanation of the requirement that an access
control measure "effectively control access" to a copyrighted work:
[A] technological measure "effectively controls access to a work" if the
measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of
information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright
owner, to gain access to the work.22
As will be seen below, these definitional provisions have caused their
own share of difficulty for courts called upon to construe the DMCA.23
Congress contemplated three broad types of exemptions from the
DMCA's liability provisions. First, the statute includes a number of
provisions excusing certain types of users from the statute's liability
provisions, including nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational
institutions;24 law enforcement and intelligence agents;25 competing
developers of interoperable computer software;26 and encryption and
security researchers.27 Second, Congress provided a mechanism by which
certain types of works would be exempted from the DMCA's liability
provisions by means of a triennial administrative rulemaking conducted
by the Library of Congress upon the recommendation of the Register of
Copyrights." Finally, Congress sought to guide judicial constructions of
21 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (2006).
22 Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B).
23 See, e.g., infra notes 141-145 and accompanying text. On the textual infirmity of the
DMCA's definitional provisions, see generally infra notes 211-224 and accompanying text.
24 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (2006). These users are exempt only from the statute's anti-
circumvention provision, not its ban on trafficking in access or copy control devices. See id.
§ 1201(d)(4). They may circumvent the access controls "solely in order to make a good faith
determination of whether to acquire a copy of that work" for noninfringing purposes. Id.
§ 1201(d)(1). Other limitations in the DMCA's exception for nonprofit libraries, archives, and
educational institutions generally parallel the language used elsewhere in the Copyright Act excusing
libraries and archives from liability for copyright infringement under similar circumstances.
Compare id. § 1201(d)(5) with id. § 108(a)(2) (2006).
25 See id. § 1201 (e).
26 See id. § 1201(f).
27 See id. § 1201(g), (j).
28 See id. § 1201(a)()(B)-(D). The results of the Librarian's most recent triennial
rulemaking are available in the Federal Register. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472, 68,479-80
(Nov. 27, 2006) [hereafter "2006 Final Rule"]. I have previously suggested that the Librarian of
Congress's triennial rulemaking proceedings have been comparatively narrow and technical in scope
and that the rulemaking proceedings are unlikely to supply broad, robust immunity from DMCA
liability for acts of circumvention undertaken for lawful purposes. See Armstrong, supra note 11, at
117 n.274; cf. also infra note 270 and accompanying text (offering an illustrative example of
circumvention undertaken for noninfringing purposes that nevertheless falls outside the exemption
of the 2006 Final Rule). Although the 2006 Final Rule does excuse certain classes of uses from
DMCA liability, the Librarian has consistently rebuffed requests to promulgate broader rules
exempting most or all circumventions undertaken for noninfringing purposes. See, e.g., 71 Fed. Reg.
at 68,479 (proposed exemption #8); Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright
Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011, 62,014-15 (Oct. 31,
2003) (especially proposed exemptions #1, #2, and #4); Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention
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the statute's liability provisions by listing a number of countervailing
policies and rights with which it disclaimed any intention to interfere,
including fair use29 and freedom of expression." Congress similarly
stated that it did not intend the DMCA to alter the traditional judge-made
contours of secondary liability" or to force technology manufacturers to
include any particular form of technological protection measure in their
products.32
B. The DMCA in the Courts
The cases that have delineated the boundaries of the anti-
circumvention cause of action may be divided, without undue
oversimplification, into two categories. On one side fall the cases that
have construed the DMCA broadly, enlarging its remedial reach by
construing uncertainties in the statutory text against accused violators.
On the other side are the cases that have given the statute a narrow
reading, enunciating principles that support limits on the scope of
DMCA liability. Both sets of cases, however, give the statute a reading
that is at once rigidly formalistic and highly selective-that is, the courts
simultaneously insist that their interpretations are commanded by the
statutory text while disregarding or construing away other provisions that
actually appear in the DMCA.
1. The DeCSS Case
One of the earliest judicial applications of the DMCA, and still
the high-water mark of the expansive view of the statute, was the so-
called "DeCSS" litigation.33 DeCSS was a computer program written to
enable users to decode the audiovisual content of DVD-Video discs
of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,571-72
(Oct. 27, 2000) (rejecting proposed exemption for "'fair use' works"). In view of this history, some
commentators have concluded that "the rulemaking process faces limitations that render it incapable
of fully resolving the DMCA's adverse effect on noninfringing uses." Aaron K. Perzanowski,
Evolving Standards and the Future of the DMCA Anticircumvention Rulemaking, 10 J. INTERNET L.
1, 1(2007).
29 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) ("Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title.").
30 Id. § 1201(c)(4) ("Nothing in this section shall enlarge or diminish any rights of free
speech or the press for activities using consumer electronics, telecommunications, or computing
products.").
31 Id. § 1201(c)(2) ("Nothing in this section shall enlarge or diminish vicarious or
contributory liability for copyright infringement in connection with any technology, product, service,
device, component, or part thereof.").
Id. § 1201(c)(3) ("Nothing in this section shall require that the design of, or design and
selection of parts and components for, a consumer electronics, telecommunications, or computing
product provide for a response to any particular technological measure, so long as such part or
component, or the product in which such part or component is integrated, does not otherwise fall
within the prohibitions of subsection (a)(2) or (b)(1).").
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affid
sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
20081
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(more colloquially, "DVDs") which had been scrambled using a
rudimentary form of digital encryption known as the "Content Scramble
System," or "CSS. ' 3 4 DeCSS made it possible for users to decrypt (and
thereafter to view or copy in unencrypted form) the content of a CSS-
encrypted DVD even if the user had not paid a licensing fee to the DVD
Copy Control Association ("DVDCCA"), an industry group, for an
authorized decryption key. 5
Set-top DVD players produced by consumer electronics
manufacturers included lawful, DVDCCA-licensed decryption keys.36
Jon Johansen, a Norwegian teenager, acting in concert with unidentified
others, obtained such a licensed DVD player 7 and "reverse engineered"
it to discover the algorithm employed by the CSS encryption system.38
The practical necessity of designing DVD players to be able to play back
encrypted DVD discs effectively ensured that such reverse engineering
would be successful-that is, that it would be possible from studying the
input (an encrypted DVD) and the output (the decrypted video content)
to draw correct inferences about the decryption algorithm that was being
employed.39 The result of Johansen's work was the DeCSS program,
34 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (describing CSS). The weak form of encryption
employed by CSS led some cryptographic experts to express skepticism as to "[wihether CSS is a
serious cryptographic cipher .. " Frank A. Stevenson, Cryptanalysis of Contents Scrambling
System (Nov. 8, 1999), http://www.cs.cmu.edu/-dst/DeCSS/FrankStevenson/analysis.html.
35 See Reimerdes, Il1 F. Supp. 2d at 310-11 & n.60; see also DVD Copy Control Ass'n
Inc. v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 188 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining content industry's
reliance on exclusive licensing scheme to limit dissemination of decryption keys).
36 See Reimerdes, I l1 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
37 Id. at 311. The court's reference to "a licensed DVD player," id., presumably signifies
either a hardware or software DVD player that Johansen and his collaborators had purchased.
Although the district court remarked that "[n]either Mr. Johansen nor his collaborators obtained a
license from the DVD CCA[,]" id., the significance of this finding is unclear; having lawfully
purchased a licensed DVD player, the parties surely had no reason to think themselves obliged to
purchase a second license to make use of their purchased player. Cf infra notes 132-135 and
accompanying text.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311. "Reverse engineering"-ascertaining the likely
content of a computer program based on inferences from studying its inputs and outputs-has been
commonly recognized not to present a copyright problem, even where some intermediate copying of
copyrighted works occurs, particularly where the effect of the "reverse engineering" is to aid in the
development of new platforms for the use of copyrighted content and thereby to foster competition.
See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602-08 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding reverse engineering of plaintiff's copyrighted software code lawful under fair use doctrine
notwithstanding possible losses to plaintiff due to competition with defendant's unlicensed platform
for its software); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting plaintiff's claim that defendant's reverse engineering infringed its copyright, and
observing that "an attempt to monopolize the market by making it impossible for others to compete
runs counter to the statutory purpose of promoting creative expression and cannot constitute a strong
equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair use doctrine"); cf Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding state statute authorizing contractual
prohibitions on reverse engineering preempted as incompatible with purposes of the Copyright Act).
But cf. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting limits
on lawful reverse engineering); see also infra notes 129-131 (noting courts' concern with
interpreting the DMCA to avoid harm to competition).
See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Microsoft Research DRM Talk, June 17, 2004,
http://craphound.com/msftdrm.txt ("At the end of the day, all DRM systems share a common
vulnerability: they provide their attackers with ciphertext, the cipher and the key. At this point, the
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which was posted on Johansen's web site and quickly spread to hundreds
of other sites worldwide. °
Journalist Eric Corley copied the DeCSS program to his web
server and made it available for readers to download.41 This prompted a
DMCA lawsuit against Corley and his publishing company. Corley
removed DeCSS from his web site following the district court's grant of
a preliminary injunction to the movie studio plaintiffs,42 but maintained
hyperlinks from his site to other sites that "purport[ed] to offer [the
software] for download."43 The district court found that both Corley's
original posting of the DeCSS program and his posting of hyperlinks to
other web sites where the program had been made available violated
Section 1201(a)(2)'s prohibition on trafficking in access control
circumvention technologies. '
The court reasoned that CSS was a "technological measure that
effectively controls access to" a copyrighted work-to wit, the movie
contained on a DVD disc. It rejected the defendants' arguments that CSS
could not be said to "effectively control access to" the copyrighted
content of a DVD because it was a minimal form of encryption.45 The
court reasoned that because CSS, "'in the ordinary course of its
operation, requires the application of information or a process or a
treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to a
work,"'" it satisfied the statutory definition of "effectively control
access." The protections of the DMCA, in other words, did not turn upon
whether the measure was actually "effective"-that is, whether it
functioned in such a way as to frustrate unauthorized attempts to access
the work.47 Rather, the court reasoned, the dispositive question was
whether the copyright owners had granted express permission for the
secret isn't a secret anymore."). Princeton University computer scientist Edward Felten made the
same point during the Bunner litigation over the trade secret status of CSS:
Because so many people have the skills and tools to reverse-engineer programs,
[DVDCCA's] decision to authorize the release of CSS in software form made it virtually
inevitable that somebody, somewhere, would reverse engineer it .... Once CSS became
public knowledge, its keys inevitably also would have become public knowledge.... It is
common knowledge that use of a forty-bit key allows an easy brute-force search to
determine the key, given a sample of encrypted material (e.g., a DVD movie disk).
Decl. of Prof. Edward W. Felten in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., part V In 5-6 (Nov. 28,
2001), available at http://w2.eff.org/IP/Video/DVDCCAcase/20011128_feltendecl.html.
40 Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d at 311.41 /d. at 312.
42 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(granting preliminary injunction).
43 Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d at 311,312-13 & n.98.
44 Id. at 316-24 (finding violation of Section 1201(a)(2) based on Corley's posting of
DeCSS program), 324-25 (finding violation based on posting of hyperlinks to other web sites where
DeCSS was available for download); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
45 See Reimerdes, 11l F. Supp. 2d at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B) (2006)).
47 See id. at 318 ("CSS 'effectively controls access' to copyright DVD movies. It does
so, within the meaning of the statute, whether or not it is a strong means of protection.").
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creation of the circumvention tool at issue: DeCSS circumvented what
was "effectively" an access control mechanism because the copyright
holder had provided an avenue for authorized decryption of the protected
content (to wit, purchase of a license from the DVDCCA) with which the
designers of DeCSS had failed to comply." Because there was no
"authority of the copyright owner" for the creation of such a tool, the
court reasoned, the dissemination of DeCSS by the defendants
necessarily violated the DMCA.49
The court rejected the defendants' argument that circumvention
of a technological measure for the purpose of making a fair use of the
underlying copyrighted work would be permissible under the DMCA.5°
The court's reasoning began with the truism that copyright infringement
and violations of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA are
distinct offenses.5 A defense to the former, accordingly, was not
automatically a defense to the latter. The statutory text, however, was
silent on the question whether fair use could be raised as a defense to a
claim under the DMCA. The court construed this silence as an implicit
legislative rejection of the fair use defense, reasoning that "[i]f Congress
had meant the fair use defense to apply to such [DMCA] actions, it
would have said so."" 2 Rather than "saying so," however, Congress gave
indications that the court found adequate to conclude that fair use of the
underlying copyrighted work could not immunize a party from liability
for circumventing an access control mechanism. The court pointed, first,
to the fact that authorization by the copyright holder was a complete
defense to a DMCA violation; second, to the fact that Congress delayed
the statute's effective date; and third, to the enumeration of some
exceptions to liability in the DMCA itself.53 The court found the DMCA
"crystal clear" in providing no fair use defense to a trafficking claim'
and refused any suggestion that it should construe the statute in favor of
such an exception. "In such circumstances," the court concluded, "courts
48 Seeid. at317-18.
49 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 317 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B)) ("[A]
technological measure 'effectively controls access to a work' if the measure, in the ordinary course
of its operation, requires ... the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to [the] work.").
5o Id. at 321-24. The defendants raised this argument in an ultimately unsuccessful effort
to bring DeCSS within the "safe harbor" announced in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984), for technologies "capable of substantial noninfringing uses." See
Reimerdes, Il1 F. Supp. 2d at 323-24. In general, the courts have resisted importing the Sony
analysis, which arose originally in the context of a claim for contributory copyright infringement, as
a defense to claims under the DMCA. See, e.g., RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No.
2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
51 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322. But see infra Part M.A.
52 Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d at 322.
53 Id. at 323.
54 Id. at 324.
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may not undo what Congress so plainly has done by construing the
words of the statute to accomplish a result that Congress rejected."55
The persuasive force of Reimerdes is occasionally impaired by
the heated-at times, borderline intemperate-rhetoric of the court's
opinion. For example, the court seemed to insinuate that the DeCSS
technology was guilty by association with various sordid topics also
covered in the defendants' magazine.56 The court apparently found it
damning that the defendants had previously published "a guide to the
federal criminal justice system for readers charged with computer
hacking."" Elsewhere, the court likened the defendants to political
assassins and the DeCSS code to a virus.5" It painted the authors of
DeCSS, who plausibly claimed to be motivated by the desire to play their
lawfully purchased DVD discs on computers running the Linux
operating system,59 essentially as anarchists, describing them as
"adherents of a movement that believes that information should be
available without charge to anyone clever enough to break into the
computer systems or data storage media in which it is located."'  The
effect is to make it difficult to tell whether, and to what extent, the
court's sweeping reading of the DMCA's liability provisions, and its
denial that copyright's fair use doctrine was relevant to the reach of the
55 Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No.
2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000) (reasoning that accused
producer of circumvention tool may not defend against DMCA claim based on its customers' fair
uses of the tool).
56 Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d at 308-09 ("Not surprisingly, 2600: The Hacker Quarterly
has included articles on such topics as how to steal an Internet domain name, access other people's
e-mail, intercept cellular phone calls, and break into the computer systems at Costco stores and
Federal Express.") (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 343 ("Defendants are in the business of
disseminating information to assist hackers in 'cracking' various types of technological security
systems."). The court's repeated use of the words "hacker" and "hacking" as pejorative epithets-a
usage at odds with the generally accepted meaning of those terms among technologically
sophisticated computer users, for whom the word "hacker" connotes skill and competence rather
than malicious intent-also suggests a certain visceral dislike of the defendants. Cf, e.g., LAWRENCE
LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 8 (2006) ("Our government has already criminalized the core ethic of
this movement, transforming the meaning of hacker into something quite alien to its original
sense."); ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR 231-32 (1999) (explaining
terminological distinctions between skillful "hackers" and malicious "crackers"). See generally SAM
WILLIAMS, FREE AS IN FREEDOM: RICHARD STALLMAN'S CRUSADE FOR FREE SOFrWARE app. B
(2002).
57 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 309. Creating such a guide, one might presume, could
as readily be portrayed as a form of public service. Cf., e.g., United States Dep't of Justice, National
Criminal Justice Reference Service, http://www.ncjrs.gov/.
58 Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d at 304.
59 See id. at 311.
60 Id. at 346. The court's comparison of the free and open-source software movement to
destructive anarchism, already a strained analogy at the time of its decision, became wholly
insupportable in the years following Reimerdes. See, e.g., DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D.
WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: How MASS COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 92 (2006) ("No
longer just an ad-hoc collection of individual volunteers, most of the participants in the Linux
ecosystem are paid employees of Fortune 100 tech firms.").
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DMCA, truly rest upon a careful construction of the statute rather than
on the judge's manifest visceral dislike of the defendants.6
That the court's hostile rhetoric provides the key to
understanding its analysis is further evidenced by the fact that,
considered on its own terms, Reimerdes articulates a facially dubious
construction of the statutory text. Section 1201(c)(1) of the DMCA, for
example, states Congress's intention not to constrict the scope of the fair
use doctrine.62 According to the Reimerdes court, this provision signified
only that fair use remained a defense to a claim for copyright
infringement but did not provide a defense to a claim arising under the
DMCA.63 As so construed, however, Section 1201(c)(1) is mere
surplusage, adding nothing to the statutory fair use defense to copyright
infringement already provided in Section 107 of the Copyright Act.' 4
Settled principles of interpretation counsel against a construction that
renders statutory language superfluous.65
Still more troubling is the tension between the court's
interpretation of the text of the DMCA and the provisions of the
copyright treaties that the DMCA was enacted to implement. As the
Reimerdes court noted,66 Congress passed the DMCA to implement the
United States' obligations under the WIPO Copyright Treaty.6' Article 11
of that Treaty requires signatory nations to prohibit circumvention of
technological measures "that restrict acts.., which are not authorized by
the authors concerned or permitted by law."'  Fair use of copyrighted
61 See also Mark Deffner, Note, Unlawful Linking: First Amendment Doctrinal
Difficulties in Cyberspace, 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REv. 111, 133-34 (2002) (noting that "[e]lements
of the Reimerdes court's opinion would seem to point towards picking a conclusion first and then
finding reasons to support it" and identifying other "aspects of the court[']s decision" that "also
suggest a predisposition against the defendant").
62 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2006) ("Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title.").
63 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. The court of appeals also read
§ 1201(c)(1) in a similar fashion. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d
Cir. 2001).
64 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); see also Landau, supra note 20, at 299-300 ("If fair use
only applied to acts of copying once access was authorized, the language under section 107 would
cover the defendant's activities. Adding a fair use provision in section 1201 shows that fair use was
meant to be considered in situations involving circumvention technologies.").
65 See, e.g., Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 476-77 (2003) ("Absent a
statutory text or structure that requires us to depart from normal rules of construction, we should not
construe the statute in a manner that is strained and, at the same time, would render a statutory term
superfluous."); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) ("We are thus 'reluctan[t] to treat
statutory terms as surplusage' in any setting.... We are especially unwilling to do so when the term
occupies so pivotal a place in the statutory scheme as does the word 'State' in the federal habeas
statute.") (citations omitted); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (relying on "the
assumption that Congress intended each of its terms to have meaning").
66 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 11l F. Supp. 2d 294, 316 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), aff'd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
67 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
68 WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 14, art. II (emphasis added). The obligation
created under Article 18 of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty is phrased similarly.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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works, however, is expressly "permitted by law" in the United States.69
To the extent that the DMCA is interpreted to implement the treaty
obligations that prompted its enactment, 70 accordingly, the statute cannot
plausibly be read to forbid circumvention for fair use. 71 Although the
Reimerdes court recognized that its interpretation of the DMCA "le[ft]
technologically unsophisticated persons who wish to make fair use of
encrypted copyrighted works without the technical means of doing so," it
declared that this problem was "a matter for Congress. '72 A court less
animated by hostility to the defendants in the case at bar might more
readily have perceived such an absurd consequence as evidence of error
in its interpretation of the statute.73
2. The Durable Goods Cases
In a trio of more recent cases-Chamberlain Group, Inc. v.
Skylink Technologies, Inc. ," Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc. 7' and Storage Technology Corporation v. Custom
Hardware Engineering & Consulting, Inc. 7 6 -two federal courts of
appeals refused to apply the DMCA to prevent circumvention of access
control mechanisms embedded in durable goods.
69 17 U.S.C. § 107.
70 On the general principles applicable to the interpretation of statutes and treaties, see
LA NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 32:6 (6th ed.
2008).
71 The Clinton Administration's 1995 White Paper, which also prompted the enactment
of the DMCA, suggested this very solution to the possible conflict between copyright's fair use
doctrine and its proposed anti-circumvention law. The White Paper recommended the enactment of
legislation prohibiting circumvention of copy controls "without authority of the copyright owner or
the law[.]" White Paper, supra note 12, at 230 (emphasis added). It then reasoned that "if [a]
circumvention device is primarily intended and used for legal purposes, such as fair use, the device
would not violate the provision, because a device with such purposes and effects would fall under
the 'authorized by law' exemption." Id. at 231.
72 Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d at 324.
73 The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision on appeal. Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). The appellate court's decision adds little to our
understanding of the DMCA, however, because the appellants elected to rely primarily on
constitutional, rather than statutory, arguments. See id. at 444-45, 458-59. The appellants first argued
that limitations on fair use offended First Amendment principles. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Court
of Appeals reasoned that the functional characteristics of the DeCSS code disentitled it to the full
extent of First Amendment protection that attaches to ordinary speech, and that the DMCA was a
content-neutral regulation that served a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of free expression and was not unduly burdensome. See id. at 452-54. I have previously
expressed doubt as to the ongoing viability of this portion of the court's analysis. See Armstrong,
supra note 11, at 68 n.87. If we conceptualize fair use as protecting First Amendment values, as the
Supreme Court did in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003), then constructions of the
DMCA that work to restrict fair use in practice may become constitutionally suspect. More recent
cases may suggest greater judicial willingness to subject copyright legislation to First Amendment
scrutiny. See, e.g., Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1187-96 (10th Cir. 2007). The Court of
Appeals further rejected any argument grounded on the Progress Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8, rather than the First Amendment. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 458-59.
74 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See infra notes 77-104 and accompanying text.
75 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). See infra notes 105-145 and accompanying text.
76 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005). See infra notes 146-154 and accompanying text.
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a. Chamberlain v. Skylink
In Chamberlain v. Skylink, the plaintiff, Chamberlain,
manufactured garage door openers that incorporated what the court
presumed to be copyrighted computer software code.77 Chamberlain's
software was designed to recognize a certain set of transmitted numerical
codes as valid commands to open the owner's garage door.78
Chamberlain included in its software a separate routine that would
"reset" the listing of accepted codes, enabling a user to open their garage
door even if the first transmitted code was not recognized as valid.79
Skylink, a competitor, produced and sold a "universal transmitter" that
was capable of operating with garage door openers sold by many other
companies, including Chamberlain's. Skylink's transmitter was designed
to transmit a burst of three code sequences in rapid succession that would
either be recognized as a correct code, or else trigger the "reset" routine
in Chamberlain's software-resulting, in either case, in the opening of
the owner's garage door.8"
Chamberlain sued, alleging that the code sequences were
technological measures that protected access to the copyrighted software
embedded in its garage door openers. The district court granted summary
judgment to Skylink on Chamberlain's DMCA claim, and the court of
appeals affirmed.8
The court in Chamberlain, like the court in Reimerdes,
characterized the dispositive issue as whether the defendant had
authority to access plaintiff s copyrighted work in the manner in which it
did. 2 The two courts' conceptions of what "authorization" entailed,
however, could scarcely be more dissimilar. Whereas Reimerdes had
looked only at whether the copyright owner had granted express
permission for the defendant's access,83 the Chamberlain court viewed
the lack of Chamberlain's permission as essentially irrelevant to the
77 The court believed itself required to assume that Chamberlain's program was covered
by copyright because of the procedural posture in which the appeal arose-to wit, the grant of
summary judgment in favor of Skylink. See Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1185 n.4. Accordingly, the
court refrained from discussing in detail whether the existence of a valid copyright-the sine qua
non of protection under the DMCA, see infra note 166-had been satisfactorily demonstrated by the
plaintiff. From what little the court's opinion reveals, however, there would appear to be at least
some grounds to question whether Chamberlain's software, which was designed predominantly to
fulfill the functional purpose of opening and closing owners' garage doors, qualified for DMCA
protection at all. See infra note 137; cf. infra note 120.
78 For a fuller description of the operation of Chamberlain's product, see Chamberlain,
381 F.3d at 1183-84.
79 See id. at 1184-85.
80 See id.
81 Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1046 (N.D. I11.
2003), affid, 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204.
82 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2006) (defining both "circumvent a
technological measure" and "effectively controls access to a work" in terms that require
consideration of "the authority of the copyright owner").
83 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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question before it, because the copyright statute itself supplied the
necessary "authorization" for Skylink's access." So long as Skylink's
product was designed to enable uses that the copyright statute permitted,
in other words, trafficking in such a device did not constitute a DMCA
violation notwithstanding Chamberlain's denial of permission.85 The
court rejected Chamberlain's argument (which the Reimerdes court
surely would have accepted) that "all such uses of products containing
copyrighted software to which a technological measure controlled access
are now per se illegal under the DMCA unless the manufacturer provided
consumers with explicit authorization."86
Although the court declared that its "inquiry ends with [the] clear
language" of the DMCA,87 it went on to consider the issue in light of the
statute's background, structure, and purpose. It found that the "[s]tatutory
structure and legislative history both make it clear that § 1201 applies
only to circumventions reasonably related to protected rights."88 Quoting
from the legislative history, the court emphasized Congress's intention
"'to specify, with as much clarity as possible, how the right against anti-
circumvention would be qualified to maintain balance between the
interests of content creators and information users.' '"89 That balance
would be upset, the court reasoned, if the statute were read as
Chamberlain wished. The crux of the matter, in the court's view, was
Chamberlain's insistence "that no necessary connection exists between
access and copyrights"o--that is, that anti-circumvention liability under
the DMCA was unrelated to the question whether the defendant had
infringed, or contributed to the infringement, of plaintiffs copyrights.
Noting that the DMCA was enacted in part to deter copyright
infringement, the court reasoned that it would be illogical to construe the
statute so as to make irrelevant the question whether the plaintiff actually
faced potential infringement. The court concluded that "Congress could
not have intended such a broad reading of the DMCA."'
As a policy matter, this interpretation of the DMCA may have
much to commend it. It harmonizes the DMCA with the remainder of the
Copyright Act in a fashion that self-consciously seeks to preserve the
84 See Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1193 ("[T]he copyright laws authorize consumers to use
the copy of Chamberlain's software embedded in the GDOs that they purchased. .... [C]opyright
laws authorize members of the public to access a work."); id. at 1182 ("Skylink's accused devices
enables onl uses that copyright law expressly authorizes, and is therefore presumptively legal.").
8 Cf supra note 71.
86 Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1193.
87 Id. at 1194.
88 Id. at 1195 (emphasis added). This is, to be sure, not a holding that actual infringement
must be proven before DMCA liability can attach. Short of that showing, however, it is not clear
what the court means by the requirement of a "reasonable relation" between infringement of the
plaintiff's copyright and the viability of its claim under the DMCA.
89 Id. at 1196 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-551, at 26 (1998)).
90 Id. at 1197.
91 Id.; see also infra note 175.
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Copyright Act's balancing of the interests of content creators on the one
hand and consumers and users of copyrighted works on the other.92
Furthermore, it neatly sidesteps the often-debated question whether the
DMCA is inherently inimical to fair use.93
The court's interpretation, however, makes a sufficiently poor fit
with the text of the DMCA as enacted to raise challenging questions
concerning the decision's persuasive force in future cases. Nothing in the
text of Section 1201, for example, expressly conditions a defendant's
anti-circumvention or trafficking liability upon a prior showing of
copyright infringement.94 Articulating the contrary view, the Copyright
Office has suggested that, while circumvention of a copy control
mechanism for a noninfringing purpose would survive scrutiny under the
DMCA, circumvention of an access control mechanism for the same
purpose would be illegal.95  The Chamberlain court's apparent
assumption that the defendant must have either infringed, or at least
helped contribute to the infringement of, plaintiff's copyrights also
coexists uneasily alongside Congress's express disavowal in the DMCA
of any intention to alter the existing contours of secondary liability for
copyright infringement.96 In short, by purporting to rest its decision upon
92 The notion of a proper balancing of interests as between creators and consumers of
content has been recognized as essential to serving the broader public interest in the creation and
dissemination of new works, a process that could readily be stifled if creators' rights grew too
powerful. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (copyright
law "reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts."); White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
("Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it .... Culture, like science
and technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who came
before. Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it's supposed to nurture."); YOCHAI BENKLER,
THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 38 (2006) ("If we pass a law that regulates information production too
strictly, allowing its beneficiaries to impose prices that are too high on today's innovators, then we
will have not only too little consumption of information today, but also too little production of new
information for tomorrow.").
93 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 8; Armstrong, supra note 11, at 51 n.5. The court in
Chamberlain was careful to reserve judgment on this question. See Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1199
n.14.
94 Indeed, legislative proposals to amend the DMCA to expressly permit circumvention
for noninfringing purposes tend to negate any suggestion that the existing statutory text already
embraces such a rule. See H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005), § 5(b)(1) (proposing to amend
17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) by adding the following text: "and it is not a violation of this section to
circumvent a technological measure in order to obtain access to the work for purposes of making
noninfringing use of the work").
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998: U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY 4 (1998), available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf
("[S]ince the fair use doctrine is not a defense to the act of gaining unauthorized access to a work,
the act of circumventing a technological measure in order to gain access is prohibited."). As noted
above, nothing in the DMCA forbids circumvention of copy controls, although such circumvention
may be punishable under ordinary copyright law where it results in copyright infringement. See
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
96 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(2) (2006); see also Zohar Efroni, Towards a Doctrine of
"Fair Access" in Copyright: The Federal Circuit's Accord, 46 IDEA 99, 107 (2005) ("[The text of
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the "clear language" of the DMCA, 97 the Chamberlain court may have
limited the persuasive reach of its own decision, for the actual language
of the DMCA may as readily support a conclusion opposite the one the
Chamberlain court reached.98
This is particularly true with respect to the court's treatment of
the pivotal issue of authorization. The DMCA, as the court correctly
observed, "defines circumvention as an activity undertaken 'without the
authority of the copyright owner."' 9  The court concluded, however, that
the copyright owner's denial of authorization was not dispositive, based
on the court's conclusion that other provisions of the Copyright Act
provide an alternative source of "authority."" This latter interpretation,
to be sure, finds support in sources outside the statutory text."1 A court
more inclined to focus on the text of the statute itself, however, 2 might
as readily conclude that the phrase "authority of the copyright owner"'' 3
necessarily implies that such authority is for the "copyright owner" to
grant or withhold at its election."°
b. Lexmark International v. Static Control Components
The court in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc.'05 avoided the Chamberlain court's entanglement in the
thicket of "authorization," relying instead on the dubious notion that the
purchase of a product containing unencrypted software code necessarily
conferred on consumers the right to extract and copy that code." 6
Lexmark involved a DMCA claim brought by a manufacturer of
computer printers against a supplier of aftermarket refilled toner
cartridge components. 7 Lexmark, the printer manufacturer, sought to
avail itself of the protections of the DMCA by embedding a piece of
copyrighted software, the "Printer Engine Program," in its printers, and
another software program, the "Toner Loading Program," in its toner
cartridges.0 8 One purpose of these programs was to limit consumers'
neither the anti-circumvention nor the anti-trafficking provisions conditions liability with showing a
link to activity that interferes with traditional copyrights.").
97 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
98 See Efroni, supra note 96, at 106 (suggesting that "Chamberlain performed a
considerable deviation from the textual and contextual framework of the law in order to promote a
certain policy").
99 Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1193 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A)) (emphasis
added).
100 See id.
101 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
102 See, e.g., infra note 194.
103 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).
104 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
105 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
106 Id. at 546-47.
107 See id. at 529.
108 See id. at 529-30.
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freedom to install non-Lexmark toner cartridges by disabling their
printers if they did so. Upon powering up, each Lexmark printer
performed a two-step authentication sequence.1°" It first queried a
separate microchip inside the inserted toner cartridge, which contained
an eight-byte key combination. Applying a publicly available encryption
algorithm known as "Secure Hash Algorithm-l" or "SHA-1,""' the
printer calculated an authentication code based on the toner cartridge's
eight-byte key. Authentication succeeded if the result the printer
calculated matched a parallel calculation undertaken by the chip on the
toner cartridge itself. During the second stage of the authentication
sequence, the Printer Engine Program downloaded a copy of another
very short program (the Toner Loading Program) from a chip on the
toner cartridge and computed a checksum of the downloaded bytes."'
This stage of the authentication procedure succeeded if the checksum the
Printer Engine Program calculated matched a value encoded elsewhere
on the toner cartridge chip. The printer shut itself down unless both steps
of the authentication procedure succeeded. The authentication procedure
sought to ensure that consumers used only toner cartridges (whether new
or refilled) supplied by Lexmark."'
Although defendant Static Control Components ("SCC") did not
compete directly with Lexmark, it sold chips to Lexmark's competitors
in the market for remanufactured toner cartridges."' SCC's chips enabled
Lexmark's competitors to produce toner cartridges that mimicked the
two-stage authentication sequence when used in a Lexmark printer. SCC
advertised that its chips successfully bypassed the first step of Lexmark's
authentication sequence." 4 For the second step of the sequence, SCC's
chips contained a byte-for-byte copy of Lexmark's Toner Loading
Program, which enabled the chip to pass Lexmark's "checksum"
calculation." 5
Lexmark charged that SCC's chips infringed Lexmark's
copyrights in the Printer Engine Program and Toner Loading Program.
Lexmark also alleged that SCC's chips circumvented, in violation of the
DMCA, a technological measure (specifically, the first step of the two-
step authentication sequence) that "effectively controlled access" to its
copyrighted programs." 6 A federal district court agreed and preliminarily
109 See id. at 530.
110 Id.
I d. at 531.
112 See id. at 530-31.
13 Id. at 530.
14 Id.; see also id. at 537 (observing that SCC did not duplicate the algorithm Lexmark
used in the first step of its authentication procedure, but instead "replaced Lexmark's SHA-I
function with a different publicly available encryption program").
115 Id. at 530-31.
116 Id. at 531.
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enjoined SCC's distribution of its chips."7 On SCC's appeal, a fractured
panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed."8 The three panel judges wrote three
separate opinions, although they agreed unanimously that Lexmark could
not show a likelihood of success on its DMCA claim."9
The panel first expressed doubt that Lexmark's Toner Loading
Program ("TLP"), which was largely dictated by functional concerns and
occupied only 37 to 55 bytes of memory, was eligible for copyright
protection at all-a necessary prerequisite to any claim under the
DMCA.' 20
Lexmark's longer and more complex Printer Engine Program
("PEP"), SCC conceded, was protected by copyright. 121 The panel,
however, reasoned that the printer's authentication sequence failed to
"effectively control access" to that program. The PEP, the panel
observed, was built into every Lexmark printer and existed, unencrypted,
in printer memory, where a sufficiently technologically knowledgeable
user could access it at any time without needing to employ Lexmark's
authentication sequence. For that reason, the court wrote:
It is not Lexmark's authentication sequence that "controls access" to the Printer
Engine Program. It is the purchase of a Lexmark printer that allows "access" to
the program. Anyone who buys a Lexmark printer may read the literal code of
the Printer Engine Program directly from the printer memory, with or without
the benefit of the authentication sequence, and the data from the program may
be translated into readable source code after which copies may be freely
distributed. No security device, in other words, protects access to the Printer
Engine Program and no security device accordingly must be circumvented to
obtain access to that program code.1
22
Because any user could copy the PEP without using the authentication
sequence, the court continued, that sequence could not be said to "control
117 See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D.
Ky. 2003).
18 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551.
119 See id. at 545-51; id. at 551-53 (Merritt, J., concurring); id. at 562-65 (Feikens, J.,
concurring in relevant part).
120 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 529, 537-44. The familiar general rule is that copyright
protection does not extend to words and short phrases, on the grounds that some minimum threshold
amount of expressive content must be present. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2007) (listing
examples of uncopyrightable subject matter including "[wiords and short phrases such as names,
titles, and slogans"). The functional characteristics of computer programs also impose limits on the
scope of copyright protection that they receive. See, e.g., infra note 129. On remand from the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the district court held Lexmark's Toner Loading Program
uncopyrightable. Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 2007 WL 1485770, at *6
(E.D. Ky. Apr. 18,2007).
In the court of appeals, one of the panel members (a district judge sitting by
designation) dissented from this portion of the panel majority's opinion. See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at
553-61 (Feikens, J., dissenting in part). Judge Feikens nevertheless agreed with the majority's
rejection of Lexmark's DMCA claim based on the Toner Loading Program, however, on the grounds
that Lexmark could not show that SCC's "chip was primarily designed or produced for the purpose
of accessing the TLP." Id. at 562.
12I Id. at 546.
122 Id. at 546-47 (citations omitted).
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access" to the program, and certainly could not be said to do so
"effectively":
Because the statute refers to "control[ling] access to a work protected under this
title," it does not naturally apply when the "work protected under this title" is
otherwise accessible. Just as one would not say that a lock on the back door of
a house "controls access" to a house whose front door does not contain a lock
and just as one would not say that a lock on any door of a house "controls
access" to the house after its purchaser receives the key to the lock, it does not
make sense to say that this provision of the DMCA applies to otherwise-
readily-accessible copyrighted works. Add to this the fact that the DMCA not
only requires the technological measure to "control[] access" but also requires
the measure to control that access "effectively," and it seems clear that this
provision does not naturally extend to a technological measure that restricts one
form of access but leaves another route wide open.'
23
The panel denied that its interpretation of "effectively controls
access" precluded application of the DMCA unless the plaintiff had
created "an impervious shield to the copyrighted work."' 124 The panel
insisted that the DMCA's protection did not turn upon "the degree to
which a measure controls access to a work."'' 2' But for the DMCA to
apply, the court maintained that "the challenged circumvention device
must indeed circumvent something. . ".. ,12' Because any user could read
the Printer Engine Program directly from the printer, there was nothing
to circumvent.
The two concurring opinions offered other avenues to the same
destination. One judge concurred separately on the grounds that every
purchaser of a Lexmark printer "acquire[d] an implied license to use the
Printer Engine Program for the life of that printer,"'127 and accordingly,
the DMCA could not be found to protect any "right of the copyright
owner to prevent the consumer from using" that program.2 s Another
judge would have gone even farther, concluding that extending the
protections of the DMCA to Lexmark would be incompatible with
123 Id. at 547 (citation omitted). But see Pearl Investments, LLC v. Standard I/O, Inc., 257
F. Supp. 2d 326, 350 (D. Me. 2003) ("The question of whether a technological measure 'effectively
controls access' is analyzed solely with reference to how that measure works 'in the ordinary course
of its operation.' The fact that [defendant] had alternative means of access to the works is
irrelevant .... ) (citation omitted).
124 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 549.
125 Id.
126 Id. (emphasis omitted). Cases testing the boundaries of the DMCA's definition of
"circumvention" may represent the next frontier in DMCA litigation. See, e.g., Healthcare
Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 644-45 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(malfunction of online archive's system to limit archival storage of web pages did not constitute
"circumvention" of the system); I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F.
Supp. 2d 521, 532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (defendant's unauthorized use of another party's valid
password did not constitute "circumvention" of plaintiff's password-protection mechanism). The
DMCA's definition of "circumvention" may do more to complicate the courts' task in these cases
than to sinlify it. See generally infra notes 211-215 and accompanying text.
Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 564 (Feikens, J., concurring in part).
128 Id. at 563.
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legislative intent because of its anticompetitive effects in the market.
Congress, the concurring opinion emphasized, never "intend[ed] to allow
the DMCA to be used offensively in this manner," which in the
concurring judge's view allowed a manufacturer to "create monopolies
for replacement parts.... "129 A device that circumvented such a
monopoly-creating mechanism, this opinion reasoned, could not be said
to be "primarily designed or produced for the purpose of' accessing
copyrighted works. 30 The concurrence expressed the fear that, in the
wake of the panel's decision, companies would still try to "use the
DMCA in conjunction with copyright law to create monopolies of
manufactured goods for themselves just by tweaking the facts of this
case[,]" and believed a broader opinion was required to forestall such a
result. 13'
Lexmark, like Chamberlain, differs markedly from Reimerdes in
its reading of the DMCA. The most striking contrast between Lexmark
and its predecessors, however, lies less in the court's analytical approach
and more in the attitudes and sympathies revealed in the judges'
opinions. The court in Reimerdes was openly hostile towards
technologically sophisticated parties who wished to use their own
consumer electronic products in a manner inconsistent with the desires of
those products' suppliers.'32 Lexmark is as bountifully indulgent towards
such technology-savvy users as Reimerdes was unsparingly averse. It is
scarcely possible to imagine the court in Reimerdes penning a sentence
like this one from Lexmark:
Anyone who buys a Lexmark printer may read the literal code of the Printer
Engine Program directly from the printer memory, with or without the benefit
of the authentication sequence, and the data from the program may be
translated into readable source code after which copies may be freely
distributed. 33
One cannot, of course, take this sentence literally; it is likely that
only a minuscule number of printer owners in fact possess the
technological acumen to "read the literal code of the Printer Engine
Program directly from the printer memory" as the panel somewhat
breezily suggests." Lexmark, however, remains significant insofar as it
evaluates the plaintiffs technological protection scheme from the
perspective of a knowledgeable, sophisticated end-user, rather than
129 Id. at 552 (Merritt, J., concurring).
130 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (2006)).
131 Id. at 55 1.
132 See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
133 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 546.
134 Id. Ascertaining precisely how this might be accomplished with one's own printer is
left as an exercise for the reader.
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insisting, as Reimerdes does, that users must remain ignorant of the
capabilities of the electronic products they have purchased. 35
Nevertheless, despite its normative appeal, Lexmark ultimately
articulates an interpretation of the DMCA that is not readily squared with
the statutory text. The court's stated assumption that any purchaser of a
product containing unencrypted software code is necessarily allowed to
extract that code from the product and make copies'36 surely has the
general rule backwards. Although the court's analysis would be correct
as to uncopyrighted code (or, what is the same thing, the uncopyrightable
functional characteristics of code that is nominally subject to
copyright'37), purchasers enjoy no general right to copy and distribute
unencrypted copyrighted works. 3 Audio compact discs ("CDs"), for
example, ordinarily omit any form of encryption to protect the musical
works recorded thereon,'39 but no one (and certainly not the Lexmark
court) believes that purchasers are generally immune from liability if
they copy and distribute the unencrypted content of a music CD. 4
Although it is true (indeed, it is tautological) that a plaintiff cannot
prevail under the DMCA where there is no technological measure
protecting the work in question (and therefore nothing to "circumvent"),
135 Although Lexmark took pains to distinguish Reimerdes as not involving "a situation
where the access-control measure left the literal code or text of the computer program or data freely
readable," id. at 547, Lexmark's own analytical framework seems to be far enough removed from
anything the Reimerdes court said to raise the question whether the decisions are ultimately
irreconcilable. The point is thrown into sharp relief by redrafting the "access control" discussion in
Lexmark to describe instead the technological measure that was at issue in Reimerdes:
It is not [CSS] that "controls access" to the [DVD video stream]. It is the purchase of a
[DVD player] that allows "access" to the [video stream]. Anyone who buys a [DVD
player] may read the literal code of the [player key] directly from the [player], with or
without the benefit of [CSS], and the data from the program may be translated into
readable source code after which copies may be freely distributed. No security device, in
other words, protects access to the [video stream] and no security device accordingly
must be circumvented to obtain access to that program code.
Cf id. at 546-47.
136 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
137 As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has suggested, computer programs
commonly contain elements that derive from sources other than the original creative expression of
the programmer. These elements are ipso facto outside the scope of any copyright subsisting in the
program as a whole, and must be "filtered out" of any infringement analysis. See Computer Assocs.
Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705 (2d Cir. 1992) (copyright protection does not extend to
"those elements of a computer program that are necessarily incidental to its function"); id. at 707-10
(in considering scope of copyright protection for software, courts must "filter out" any components
thereof that were "dictated by efficiency," "dictated by external factors," or "taken from the public
domain").
138 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2006).
139 The official specifications governing the format of digital audio information on music
CDs do not include any provision for the use of access or copy controls, and efforts to add such
systems to audio CDs have to date been mostly unsuccessful-even occasionally resulting in
damage to customers' electronic equipment. See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Perzanowski, The
Magnificence of the Disaster: Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident, 22 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1157 (2007). See generally Armstrong, supra note 11, at 61-62.
140 See, e.g., Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 577-78, 584-
85 (6th Cir. 2007).
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Lexmark's broader suggestion of a general right to copy unencrypted
digital works surely goes too far.
Lexmark also made no serious effort to parse and apply the
statutory definition of the pivotal DMCA clause-"effectively controls
access." Although the court included a citation to the district court's
discussion of the statutory definition,'4' absent from the court of appeals'
opinion is any analysis of whether Lexmark's authentication sequence
"in the ordinary course of its operation, require[d] the application of
information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the
copyright owner, to gain access to the work."'42 Instead, Lexmark-while
denying that it was doing so 143 -applied an understanding of "effectively
controls access" that expressly made the extent of statutory protection
dependent upon the relative strength of the plaintiffs technological
protection measure.1" Is the Lexmark court's effective revision of the
DMCA preferable as a matter of policy? Perhaps. But it remains
exceedingly difficult to shoehorn the court's interpretation into the
existing statutory language.45 The tension between the court's reasoning
and the binding text of the DMCA can only limit the decision's
precedential value-to the detriment of technology users who would
benefit from a more robustly articulated set of limitations on the scope of
the statute's circumvention and trafficking prohibitions.
c. Storage Technology Corporation v. Custom
Hardware Engineering
In Storage Technology Corporation v. Custom Hardware
Engineering & Consulting, Inc.,'" the same court that decided
Chamberlain sought again to borrow from ordinary copyright principles
to limit the reach of the DMCA. Plaintiff Storage Technology Corp.
("StorageTek") manufactured data tape storage libraries that included
copyrighted maintenance software code that loaded automatically at
141 See Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 546
(6th Cir. 2004).
142 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B) (2006).
143 See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
144 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 547 (noting that "the DMCA not only requires the
technological measure to 'control[ ] access' but also requires the measure to control that access
'effectivei1" (quoting § 1201(a)(3)(B))); cf supra note 43 and accompanying text.
To be sure, the panel opinion in Lexmark did not, as the Chamberlain panel had,
contend that its interpretation was commanded by the DMCA's literal text, relying instead on a mix
of arguments grounded in the legislative history and purpose of the statute. Compare Lexmark, 387
F.3d at 546-51, with supra note 87 and accompanying text. But cf Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 552
(Merritt, J., concurring) (complaining that Lexmark's "reading would ignore the precise language
... as well as the main point of the DMCA"); id. at 564 (Feikens, J., concurring in part) ("[U]nder
the plain meaning of the law, circumventing a technological measure ... is only a violation of
§ 1201(a) if the device allows consumers access to a work that they are not otherwise permitted to
have.").
146 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, 431 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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startup. 47 In the event of a maintenance problem, the software was
designed to transmit coded error messages describing the symptoms of
the problem only if supplied with a valid password.'48 Custom Hardware
Engineering ("CHE") was a competitor of StorageTek's in the
aftermarket for technical service and maintenance of StorageTek's
products. To access the maintenance error codes on tape libraries
manufactured by StorageTek, CHE designed two devices to circumvent
StorageTek's password protection system. 49 Doing so enabled CHE to
diagnose and repair problems with tape libraries manufactured by
StorageTek."5 ° StorageTek sued, alleging both copyright infringement
and violation of the DMCA. It alleged that, by causing StorageTek's
customers' tape libraries to transmit coded error messages, CHE had
circumvented its password authentication mechanism and thereby gained
access to (and created an unauthorized copy of) StorageTek's
copyrighted maintenance software."'
The court rejected StorageTek's copyright claims, finding CHE's
activities protected by a statutory safe harbor for copies necessarily made
in the course of maintenance or repair of a computer.'52 The failure of
StorageTek's claims for copyright infringement, the court then
continued, was all but dispositive of its claims under the DMCA. The
court reasoned, citing Chamberlain, that:
To the extent that CHE's activities do not constitute copyright infringement or
facilitate copyright infringement, StorageTek is foreclosed from maintaining an
action under the DMCA. That result follows because the DMCA must be read
in the context of the Copyright Act, which balances the rights of the copyright
owner against the public's interest in having appropriate access to the work.
147 See id. at 1309-10. Strangely, StorageTek did not license the code to its own
customers, necessarily (if paradoxically) implying that every customer infringed StorageTek's
copyright in the code each time they turned their purchased hardware on. See id. at 1310 (noting that,
although "StorageTek provides the entire [software] code to the customer," the accompanying
"license covers only ... portions of the software, and it specifically excludes the maintenance
code"). Most likely, StorageTek was attempting to avoid-unsuccessfully, as it turned out, see id. at
1311-15-the application of 17 U.S.C. § 117(c), which allows copying of"an authorized copy of [a]
computer program ... for purposes ... of maintenance or repair .... " 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2006)
(emphasis added). The copies of the maintenance software StorageTek had installed on its own
customers' machines were, by the terms of its own license, unauthorized copies. StorageTek's
apparent adversarial attitude towards its own customers surely heightened the court's skepticism
towards StorageTek's interpretation of the DMCA.
148 See Storage Tech., 421 F.3d at 1310. Presumably, StorageTek's intention in adopting
this password authentication mechanism was effectively to prevent its customers or competitors
from performing their own maintenance on StorageTek's tape libraries.
149 See id. As the court described it, CHE's two devices worked somewhat differently-
one by computing a valid password for StorageTek's system, the other apparently by preventing the
system from requesting a password at all-but the differences are immaterial for present purposes.
150 Id.
151 See id.
152 Id. at 1311-15; see also Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting,
Inc., 431 F.3d 1374, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (opinion on denial of rehearing) (reiterating court's
conclusion that safe harbor of 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) covered CHE's activities). The copyright safe
harbor provision on which the court relied was itself enacted in 1998 as part of the DMCA. See infra
note 174.
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Therefore, courts generally have found a violation of the DMCA only when the
alleged access was intertwined with a right protected by the Copyright Act. To
the extent that StorageTek's rights under copyright law are not at risk, the
DMCA does not create a new source of liability.153
This interpretation of the DMCA rests upon the foundation of the
court's earlier decision in Chamberlain and, like that decision, is subject
to the objection that the DMCA itself does not require a plaintiff to
demonstrate an antecedent act of copyright infringement as a
precondition to liability under either the anti-circumvention or trafficking
provisions.'54 Again, although the result in StorageTek might be
defensible (and even superior) as a matter of wise policy, it is remarkable
how far the court was obliged to bend the statutory text to reach its
result.
1I. How SHOULD THE COURTS INTERPRET THE DMCA?
If there is a common thread to be found uniting the judicial
decisions that construe the DMCA broadly with those that construe the
statute narrowly, it is their shared disregard of inconvenient provisions
that actually appear in the statutory text and point to a conclusion
contrary to the one the court reached. Reimerdes effectively struck out
the DMCA's express guarantee of continued fair use;'55 Chamberlain, the
statute's reference to "the authority of the copyright owner;"15 6 and
Lexmark, its definition of "effectively controls access."' 57 Efforts to
develop a coherent jurisprudence under the DMCA are only hampered,
however, by judicial insistence on disregarding the text of the statute
while simultaneously declaring that the text alone justifies the decision in
the case at bar. However desirable either set of decisions might appear as
a normative matter, their precedential force will be diminished if future
courts find it difficult to harmonize DMCA precedents with the language
of the DMCA itself. Judged against the standard of fidelity to the
statutory text-the standard that the courts themselves, by their repeated
references to what they portray as unambiguous statutory commands,
seem to invite-the principal DMCA cases on both sides come up short.
If the courts are not simply enforcing the DMCA according to its
literal terms, they must necessarily be exercising a measure of
interpretive discretion-creating meaning from, rather than merely
finding it in, the statutory language. Forthright judicial acknowledgment
of this reality, rather than the making of unsustainable pronouncements
as to what the statutory text alone is perceived to command, holds greater
153 Storage Tech., 421 F.3d at 1318 (citations omitted).
154 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 141-145 and accompanying text.
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promise in developing a rational and consistent body of DMCA case law.
Rather than ignoring provisions of the DMCA that suggest decisions
contrary to the ones they wish to reach, we should prefer instead that the
courts acknowledge the necessity of venturing beyond the four corners of
the enacted text. Although such an acknowledgement is potentially
controversial largely for political reasons,'58 the foreseeable benefits to
both the courts and public from considering additional indicia of
meaning beyond the bare text of the DMCA suffice to outweigh the
risks. The benefits to be gained include rationality and predictability, and
ultimately a DMCA regime that more closely resembles the world
Congress believed it was creating in 1998.
The discussion that follows will begin by situating the DMCA
within the broader corpus of federal copyright law. Although the DMCA
created new obligations beyond those that already existed under the
copyright statute, it nevertheless drew heavily upon copyright concepts,
language, and policies in delimiting those obligations. Because of the
multiple interconnections between the DMCA and the remainder of
federal copyright law, the analysis then turns to the question how those
connections can and should illuminate judicial decisions. Finding the
DMCA to be unclear or internally inconsistent at a number of key
junctures, I conclude that the courts should play the same policy-making
role that they have historically performed in guiding the evolution of
copyright. Finally, by way of illustrating some consequences that might
follow if the courts were to proceed along the lines identified herein, I
consider whether existing copyright principles of fair use may serve to
guide future decisions in DMCA cases.
A. Reading the DMCA as a Copyright Statute
One identifiable source of the courts' varying readings of the
DMCA lies in their disagreements about the relevance, or lack thereof, of
the remaining provisions of the Copyright Act. As some courts (and
some litigants) have portrayed it, the DMCA stands entirely apart from
preexisting copyright law.'59 Congress, on this reading, created a sui
generis regulatory regime for technological protection systems, just as it
had previously done for semiconductor chips,"w digital audio recording
devices, 6 ' bootleg recordings,'62 and boat hulls.'63 The courts, on this
158 Although not, as I will suggest below, overly so. Cf infra Part IV and notes 274-277
and accormanying text.
See supra notes 51-55, 90 and accompanying text.
160 See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2006)).
161 See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2006)).
162 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 512(a), 108 Stat. 4809,
4974 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)).
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view, should not look outside the DMCA's anti-circumvention and
trafficking provisions to inquire, when adjudicating a DMCA claim,
whether a plaintiff's copyright interests are at stake."6
Taken as a whole, however, the statutory text does not
comfortably accommodate the attempts of decisions such as Reimerdes
to draw a sharp dividing line between the offense of copyright
infringement on the one hand and violations of the DMCA on the
other. 65 The two are clearly more closely related, their boundaries more
permeable, than these opinions suggest.
First, the DMCA contains multiple provisions that refer
explicitly to copyright language and concepts. Reference to the broader
corpus of federal copyright law is essential to give these provisions of the
DMCA any meaning at all. Liability for both circumvention and
trafficking, for instance, exists only where technological measures
protect a presently copyrighted work; that is, the existence of a valid
copyright is an express statutory precondition both to a claim for
copyright infringement and a claim arising under the DMCA.66 One of
the DMCA's two bans on trafficking in circumvention devices imposes
liability only where "a right of a copyright owner" is at stake. 67 The
DMCA does not tell us what the "rights of a copyright owner" are; only
the Copyright Act can do that.'68 To take another example: although the
DMCA refers repeatedly, at critical junctures, to the concept of the
authority of the copyright owner,69 nothing in the DMCA identifies the
copyright owner whose "authority" is needed; only the Copyright Act
does that. 7 ' Furthermore, nothing in the DMCA tells us how to
determine the scope of the "rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to
copyright infringement, including fair use,"'' or the scope of "vicarious
or contributory liability for copyright infringement,"'7 with which
Congress disclaimed any intent to interfere.
The interconnections between copyright and the DMCA are even
more substantial and pervasive, however, than the foregoing paragraph
might suggest. For example, the remedies Congress provided under the
163 See Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 501-505, 112 Stat.
2860, 2905-18 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006)).
164 Cf, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering the DMCA, 42 HoUs. L. REV. 1107, 1125
(2005) (noting that "the DMCA is not really a law about copyright. It is instead a law about
technology").
165 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
166 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2) repeatedly refer to "a work protected under this
title"--that is, protected by copyright-as the subject matter to which either anti-circumvention or
trafficking liability can attach. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(A)-(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
67 Id. § 1201(b)(1).
168 See id. § 106 (2006) (defining rights of a copyright owner).
169 The copyright owner's authority forms a part of the definitions of both "circumvent"
and "effectively controls access." Id. § 120 1(a)(3)(A)-(B) (internal quotation marks omitted).
170 See id. §§ 201-205 (2006).
171 Id. § 1201(c)(1).
172 Id. § 1201(c)(2).
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DMCA closely track the remedies available for copyright
infringement.'73  The DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions were
enacted alongside provisions creating new defenses to claims for
copyright infringement.14 Both Congress and the President justified the
enactment of the DMCA as a necessary measure to deter copyright
infringement.'75 The statute gives authority to craft exceptions from its
liability provisions in part to the Register of Copyrights.'76 Even the
placement of the statute within the United States Code carries colorable
significance: although an early version of the legislation that became the
DMCA proposed to "move[] the anti-circumvention provisions out of
Title 17" on the grounds that "these regulatory provisions have little, if
anything, to do with copyright law,"'17 the eventual inclusion of the anti-
circumvention provisions alongside the rest of the federal copyright law
173 Compare id. § 1203(b)(1) (2006) (authorizing a court to grant temporary and
permanent injunctions to prevent or restrain a DMCA violation), with id. § 502(a) (2006)
(authorizing courts to award injunctive relief to prevent or restrain infringements of copyright); id.
§ 1203(b)(2) (authorizing a court to impound any device or product it finds was involved in a
DMCA violation) with id. § 503(a) (authorizing courts to seize and impound property believed to
have been used in infringements of copyright); id. § 1203(c)(2) (authorizing a court to award actual
damages for violations of the DMCA) with id. § 504(b) (2006) (authorizing award of actual damages
to copyright holders injured through infringements of copyright); id. § 1203(c)(3) (authorizing a
complaining party to elect to recover statutory damages any time before final judgment on a DMCA
violation) with id. § 504(c)(1) (authorizing award of statutory damages to a copyright owner for
copyright infringement violations); id. § 1203(c)(5)(B) (authorizing a court to reduce or remit an
award of damages when it finds a library, archives, education institutions or public broadcasting
entity innocently violated the DMCA) with id. § 504(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (authorizing reduction in statutory
damages awards against innocent infringers, and the remitting of all statutory damages where the
copyright infringement was committed by a nonprofit archive, library, educational institution, or
public broadcaster, or the employees of such institutions).
174 The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA were added in Title I of the
legislation. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103, 112 Stat.
2860, 2861-77. Title 11 enacted what is now 17 U.S.C. § 512, creating a new statutory immunity
from liability for copyright infringement for internet service providers in certain circumstances. See
id. § 202, 112 Stat. at 2877-84. Title III of the statute amended 17 U.S.C. § 117 to provide a new
defense to claims for copyright infringement arising from computer maintenance or repair,
superseding court decisions such as MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-
19 (9th Cir. 1993). See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 302, 112
Stat. 2860, 2886-87. Title IV of the statute made various other modifications to the Copyright Act.
See id. §§ 401-407, 112 Stat. at 2887-2905. The only portion of the DMCA as enacted that is
arguably unconnected with copyright is Title V, in which Congress created a form of sui generis
intellectual property protection for the design of boat hulls, superseding the Supreme Court's
decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 143 (1989). See supra note
163.
175 See Statement on Signing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1902,
1903 (Oct. 28, 1998) ("Through enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, we have done
our best to protect from digital piracy the copyright industries that comprise the leading export of the
United States."); S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998) ("[Tlhe law must adapt in order to make digital
networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials."); id. at 8 ("Due to the ease
with which digital works can be copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously,
copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on the Internet without
reasonable assurance that they will be protected against massive piracy."); H.R. REP. No. 105-551,
pt. 2, at 25 (1998) ("[T]he digital environment poses a unique threat to the rights of copyright
owners, and as such, necessitates protection against devices that undermine copyright interests.").
176 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C); see also supra note 28.
177 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, at 23-24.
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in Title 17 would appear to indicate that Congress recognized their
connection with copyright.
More persuasive, therefore, are those courts that have attempted
to harmonize the DMCA with other provisions of copyright law,
applying the settled principle that statutes in pari materia should be
construed together."' Construing the DMCA alongside the rest of
copyright law makes available powerful analytical tools of proven
usefulness. Consider, for example, the functionality principle, which
rests upon the dichotomy long recognized in copyright law between idea
and expression. The familiar general rule is that, even where copyright
protects a work, copyright protection does not extend to aspects of the
work that are predominantly functional rather than expressive.179 Courts
applying this principle have declined to extend copyright protection to
portions of computer software"' or other articles' that reflect
predominantly functional, rather than expressive or creative, concerns."'
The functionality doctrine serves a valuable purpose in ensuring that
copyright protection does not restrict that which should remain "open
and free to the use of the public."'83
Interpreting the DMCA as a copyright statute brings copyright's
functionality doctrine into play. The functionality principle, in turn, does
much to justify decisions like Lexmark and Chamberlain. Because the
works the plaintiffs in both those cases sought to protect were closely
178 See, e.g., Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1972); Postmaster Gen.
v. Early, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 136, 152 (1827).
179 This rule is often traced to Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). There, the Court
reasoned that the copyright in the plaintiffs book on accounting did not prevent the defendant from
copying the accounting system the plaintiff had developed and described in the book. See id. at 107.
Although the literal text of the book itself was under copyright and protected against wholesale
taking, the same was not true of the functional accounting methodology that the book endeavored to
explain. See id. at 104 ("[W]hilst no one has a right to print or publish his book .... any person may
practise and use the art itself which he has described and illustrated therein .... The copyright of a
book on book-keeping cannot secure the exclusive right to make, sell, and use account-books
prepared upon the plan set forth in such book."); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)
("Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to
the expression of the idea-not the idea itself."). On the functionality doctrine in general, see 1 PAUL.
GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.15 (3d ed. Supp. 2008).
180 See supra note 137; see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 56-57 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 (explaining that 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) "is intended, among other things,
to make clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a
computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not within
the scope of the copyright law").
181 See, e.g., Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148 (2d Cir.
1987) (rejecting copyrightability of plaintiffs bicycle rack design on grounds that the design was
dictated by functional considerations involved in storing bicycles); Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ.
Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding plaintiff's molded styrene human torso
designs ineligible for copyright on grounds that designs were dictated by functional considerations
involved in display of clothing).
182 Many other examples are collected in Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and
Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439,444 n.22 (2003).
183 Baker, 101 U.S. at 104.
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bound up with utilitarian considerations,"8 the functionality principle
would suggest that those works were entitled to comparatively limited
copyright protection. Interpreting the DMCA to extend comparably
limited protections in the same circumstances might explain the courts'
decisions for the defendants in each of those cases. Conversely,
interpreting the DMCA to provide a sui generis form of protection
unconnected with traditional intellectual property principles makes such
decisions correspondingly difficult to understand in view of their
apparent departures from the text of the DMCA as written.
The functionality principle is only one of many useful analytical
tools that the courts have developed during the more than two centuries
since the enactment of the first federal copyright law.' Many of those
concepts carry as much potential explanatory power in today's digital
world as they did before the enactment of the DMCA. DMCA
jurisprudence would be needlessly impoverished if the courts were
walled off from considering the broader history of federal efforts to
protect expressive works. Borrowing from long-established copyright
principles carries no perceptible risks of flouting legislative intent, and
the courts should, therefore, assume that general copyright principles
remain applicable in cases under the DMCA.
B. Copyright, Statutory Interpretation, and the DMCA
If, as I have argued, it is correct to interpret the DMCA as a
copyright statute, rather than as a sui generis regulatory regime
unmoored from the broader corpus of intellectual property law, one
practical implication is a relatively greater policymaking role for the
courts. Although the development of federal copyright law has rested
partly upon a series of statutory enactments, i"6 the copyright statutes have
always left the courts with substantial policymaking responsibilities.
Indeed, some of the most important (and now unquestioned) doctrines in
all of copyright, such as fair use, evolved from courts seizing
policymaking functions even in the absence of an express legislative
delegation.'87 Congress, for its part, has generally not sought to craft
exhaustive, comprehensive statutory text that leaves no discretion to the
194 The software at issue in Chamberlain, which the court presumed to be copyrighted,
was designed to serve the functional purpose of enabling purchasers to open and close their garage
doors via remote control, rather than for a creative or expressive purpose. See supra notes 78-80 and
accompanying text. The copyrighted works at issue in Lexmark were a pair of computer programs
that had been written to assist with the operation of Lexmark printers, including the functionality of
testing to see whether the customer had inserted a third-party refilled toner cartridge. See supra notes
107-112 and accompanying text; see also supra note 120 and accompanying text (noting court's
doubts that Lexmark's TLP qualified for copyright protection due to its functional characteristics).
185 See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124; see also I WILLIAM F. PATRY,
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRAcTICE 25-36 (1994) (recounting history of Copyright Act of 1790).
186 See generally I WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §§ 1:19-:98 (2007)
(recountif history of federal copyright legislation since 1790).
See infra notes 231-244 and accompanying text.
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courts; to the contrary, it has repeatedly blessed judicial exercises of
independent policymaking in matters of copyright. 8 ' Copyright treatises,
too, recognize the historical and ongoing policymaking responsibilities
of the courts.1 89
This history puts one obvious objection to the creation of a
judge-made fair circumvention doctrine in a rather different light. In
substance, the objection would be that to recognize a new judge-made
doctrine of fair circumvention would be an affront to Congress's
lawmaking role. 9 Congress having spoken, the argument would run, the
courts' obligation as "faithful agents" of the legislature 9' is to apply the
enacted text as written, and to leave to Congress the task of crafting
exceptions from whatever liability rules it chose to adopt.9 The fact that
Congress expressly established certain limitations upon the liability rules
adopted in the DMCA, this line of reasoning would continue, only
strengthens the presumption against the recognition of additional
unstated exceptions by judicial fiat.'93
To be sure, the courts can and do rely on the enacted statutory
text as the primary and best indication of legislative intent,94 although
the command to apply the enacted text as written is not inexorable.'95
Nevertheless, whatever the overall merits of the interpretive theory that
courts must act only as "faithful agents," applying the statutory text
precisely as written by Congress without interjecting their own
188 See, e.g., infra notes 201-202; cf infra note 200.
189 See 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1:1, at 1-6 (2007) ("While
some lines are drawn in the Copyright Act, they are often drawn in terms that rely on the history of
copyright, and, indeed, of the history of judicial and jurisprudential thinking about copyright.");
PATRY, supra note 186, § 2:1 ("[C]ritical components of copyright law are judge-made.... [T]he
Act is a mixture of statutory and common-law features.").
190 See Efroni, supra note 96, at 100 (arguing that judicial decisions in the durable goods
cases reflect a judicial "understanding of the appropriate balance between the interests of copyright
owners and information users" that "is quite different from Congress's policy reflected in the
DMCA").
191 See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
5(2001).
192 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 20 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("Congress can
enact foolish statutes as well as wise ones, and it is not for the courts to decide which is which and
rewrite the former.").
193 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
194 See, e.g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992) (referring
to "the basic and unexceptional rule that courts must give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as
written"); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485 (1917).
195 See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (where
"'the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of
its drafters[,]' .... the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls") (quoting
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 580 (1981) ("absurd results are to be avoided and internal inconsistencies in the statute must be
dealt with"); Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 394 (1940).
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preferences or policy judgments,'96 it seems quite clear that the role of the
courts in the copyright arena is not, and properly should not be, so
limited. To the contrary, the text and history of federal copyright
legislation in the United States have made the courts more coequal
partners than mere servants of the legislature.
The courts would face a nearly insurmountable task in striving to
apply the Copyright Act strictly as written, for the statute includes
provisions that simply cannot be enforced according to their literal
terms.197 The statute's simultaneous grants of overlapping rights to
multiple parties without expressly ranking their relative priority have
raised challenging questions of policy for the courts.'98 Elsewhere, the
statute leaves pivotal terms entirely undefined.'99 The nature of the text to
196 For a book-length critique of the "faithful agent" theory, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
197 For example, the literal text of the copyright statute appears to excuse all unauthorized
copying from liability for copyright infringement-precisely the opposite of the legislative purpose.
First, the statute confers on copyright holders the "exclusive right[] ... to reproduce the copyrighted
work in copies." 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006) (emphasis added). "Copies," the statute tells us, "are
material objects... in which a work isfixed by any method .. ." Id. § 101 (emphasis added). And a
work becomes "fixed," we learn, "when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the
authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." Id. (emphasis added). A
woodenly literal reading of this text might suggest that copyright infringement is definitionally
impossible, because any copy made without "the authority of the author" is not "fixed" within the
meaning of the statutory definition, and hence not a "copy" that the copyright holder alone has the
right to make. The courts, of course, have correctly refused to read the statute in such a way as to
subvert the very possibility of liability for infringement in this fashion. See, e.g., Lewis Galoob
Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1992) ("A derivative work must be
fixed to be protected under the [Copyright] Act .... but not to infringe.") (emphases omitted).
19? See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 493 (2001) (reasoning that
individual authors' reproduction and distribution rights override compiler's rights in collective work
in which authors' contributions were included); Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402, 405-06 (7th Cir.
2000) (reasoning that copyright holder's right to prepare derivative works takes precedence over
separate provision granting creators of derivative works independent rights in their own creations).
199 See, e.g., Lindsay v. R.M.S. Titanic, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609, 1612 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(construing the undefined statutory term "author"). Congress's choice not to supply a definition of
this key term in 17 U.S.C. § 101 appears to have been deliberate, in light of the litigated
controversies over the meaning of "authorship" that predated the Copyright Act of 1976. See, e.g.,
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 11l U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884).
The Copyright Act grants copyright holders the exclusive right "to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public." 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006). The statute is
silent, however, on the meaning of the term "distribute," which has, predictably, resulted in
conflicting interpretations by the courts. Compare A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001) (reasoning that users of file-sharing software violated distribution right
by "upload[ing] file names to the search index for others to copy"), and Hotaling v. Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1997) (reasoning that a public library
violated distribution right by "add[ing] a [copyrighted] work to its collection, list[ing] the work in its
index or catalog system, and mak[ing] the work available to the borrowing or browsing public"), and
Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1173 (N.D. 111. 1997)
(placing copyrighted files on a web server from which they may be downloaded by others constitutes
"distribution"), with Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007)
(agreeing with district court that "distribution requires an actual dissemination of a copy") (quotation
marks omitted), and Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983 (D. Ariz. 2008)
("Merely making an unauthorized copy of a copyrighted work available to the public does not
violate a copyright holder's exclusive right of distribution."), and Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v.
Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 244-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding complaint's allegation that defendant
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be construed, at the outset, thus poses a substantial challenge to the
notion that the courts in copyright cases may simply begin and end their
inquiry by parsing the statute.00
Indeed, the legislative record reveals a number of instances in
which Congress in the 1976 Act intended to defer to prior judicial
practice, rather than providing new rules that would override what the
courts had previously done. The areas in which Congress deferred to
prior judicial practice include the core statutory requirement of
originality 21 and the reach of protection for depictions of useful
articles.20 2 Similarly, although the Copyright Act (unlike, say, the Patent
Act23) omits any express provisions making persons other than direct
infringers liable for copyright infringement,2 4  the courts have
consistently applied common-law principles of secondary liability in the
copyright context. 25 This judicial development of secondary liability for
"made ... [clopyrighted [r]ecordings available for distribution to others" insufficient to allege
violation of the distribution right) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). For a
critique of the courts' expansion of the distribution right to include transmissions of copyrighted
works over the Internet, see R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act's
Neglected Solution to the Controversy Over RAM "Copies", 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 125-38.
In 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), Congress listed eight nonexclusive categories of copyrightable
subject matter. Although five of the categories carry accompanying definitions in § 101, "musical
works," "dramatic works," and "pantomimes and choreographic works" do not. 17 U.S.C. §
102(a)(2)-(4) (2006). Congress explained the omission by remarking that these terms "have fairly
settled meanings." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5666-67.
200 To be sure, the Copyright Act includes a number of very detailed provisions that
Congress clearly intended to cover the waterfront within their respective spheres. See PATRY, supra
note 186, § 2:8 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112, 114, 115, 119, 122, and 512 as examples of statutory
provisions that aim to "micromanage" the courts). Most of the statute, however, is not so specific.
201 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) extends copyright protection to "original works of authorship." 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). The legislative history declared that Congress "purposely left [this phrase]
undefined .... intend[ing] to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by
the courts under" the prior statute. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 197b
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664.
202 17 U.S.C. § 113(a) recognizes that a copyright holder's exclusive reproduction fight
over a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work "includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any
kind of article .... " 17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2006). Subsection 113(b), however, offers the caveat that,
where depictions of useful articles are concerned, the statute "does not afford ... any greater or
lesser fights ... than those afforded to such works under the law ... in effect" before the effective
date of the Copyright Act of 1976. Id. § 113(b).
203 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c) (2006) (establishing liability for inducing
infringement of patent or for contributory patent infringement).
204 See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006) (providing that "[ainyone who violates any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner" shall be directly liable for copyright infringement); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,434-35 (1984) (observing that, unlike the
Patent Act, "[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed
by another").
205 See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1996)
("Although the Copyright Act does not expressly impose liability on anyone other than direct
infringers, courts have long recognized that in certain circumstances, vicarious or contributory
liability will be imposed."); id. at 261-64 (explaining theories and elements of vicarious and
contributory infringement of copyright).
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copyright received Congress's blessing in the committee reports
accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976.t 6
Even in the absence of express legislative ratification, the courts
occasionally exercise their interpretive authority under the Copyright Act
to protect countervailing policies. Thus, for example, although the literal
text of the Copyright Act appears to assign the copyright in scholarly
works to the institutions that employ the scholar,2 7 the courts have
refused to so construe the act on public policy grounds, instead invoking
a judge-made "teacher's exception" to vest in scholars themselves the
copyright interests in their own work.08 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly exercised its interpretive authority to "import" new theories of
liability, and new defenses, from the Patent Act into the Copyright Act-
citing, in each case, what the Court portrayed as strong policy reasons for
reading the Copyright Act as if it included language actually found in
another statute altogether. 9
Thus, although nominally a creature of statute, federal copyright
law has actually grown and evolved as a hybrid of statutory and
common-law principles. Partly for historical reasons, and partly because
of the vagueness of many of the governing provisions of the Copyright
Act, the courts in copyright cases have long exercised substantial
policymaking duties. Theories of statutory interpretation that demote the
courts to a more passive role, commanding them merely to read
Congress's words and apply them exactly as written, make an especially
poor fit for copyright law. The applicable statutory provisions, with few
exceptions, simply are not written in such a way as to make such judicial
passivity feasible, and two centuries of copyright history have
accustomed the courts to a more coequal role in the development of
copyright doctrine-a role Congress has repeatedly recognized and
towards which it has repeatedly expressed approval.
The DMCA is of a piece with the rest of federal copyright law in
that the text as enacted fairly cries out for a careful, nuanced parsing
rather than wooden literalism. The DMCA, like the rest of the copyright
statute, includes multiple provisions that seem to pull in conflicting
206 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674
(explaining that Congress's use of the words "to authorize" in 17 U.S.C. § 106 was "intended to
avoid any oUestions as to the liability of contributory infringers").
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining "work made for hire" to include any "work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment"); id. § 201(b) (assigning
copyright in such works made for hire to the employer).
208 See, e.g., Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412,416-17 (7th Cir. 1988).
209 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2778-80
(2005) (creating new cause of action for inducing copyright infringement based upon Patent Act's
provision at 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) for inducing patent infringement); Sony Corp. of America, 464 U.S.
at 439 (arguing that "the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law" makes it
appropriate to draw common-law copyright principles from patent law); id. at 440-42 (recognizing
new defense to secondary liability in copyright cases based upon Patent Act's provision, 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(c), immunizing seller of "a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use").
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directions.21° What is worse, the statute's definitional provisions are a
muddle, creating uncertainty at the very point where the statute most
needs (and promises) clarity. Consider first the legislative definition of
"circumvention," the key analytical concept around which both the anti-
circumvention and anti-trafficking liability provisions ultimately revolve:
[T]o "circumvent a technological measure" means to descramble a scrambled
work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove,
deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the
copyright owner .... 
211
At the most literal level, every work published in digital form is
"scrambled" or "encrypted" solely by reason of being digital. Any work
published in digital format consists of a series of ones and zeroes that
must be deciphered to reveal the work's original content 2 2-whether that
content represents the language of a poem, the color of an artist's palette,
the sound of a French horn, or the images of a motion picture. Playing an
audio CD on one's computer is an exercise in converting those ones and
zeroes back into sound waves21-a process that, under any ordinary
understanding of those words, might be thought to involve
"descrambling" or "decryption" of the content. It appears to have been
quite far from Congress's intention to forbid ordinary uses of digital
works not also protected by a separate DRM mechanism, 214 but the text
as enacted leaves ample room for a textual formalist argument that the
DMCA's reach is much more expansive in actuality.2"5 Something more
than mere literalism, in other words, is necessary to prevent this
definitional provision from vastly expanding the scope of the DMCA
beyond the limits of Congress's apparent intent.216
The other pertinent statutory definition-that of "effectively
controls access"-is still worse, although the reasons why this is so
become clear only after first attempting to construe the statute without
reference to the definition. The DMCA forbids circumvention, or the
trafficking in tools that enable circumvention, of technological measures
that "effectively control access" to a copyrighted work.217 Ordinary
210 See infra notes 247-249 and accompanying text.
211 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (2006).
212 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007).
213 See, e.g., Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 45 Fed. Appx. 887, 888-90 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (explaining CD authoring and playback); SightSound.Com Inc. v. N2K, Inc., 185 F.
Supp. 2d 445, 458 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (same).
214 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 39 (1998) (suggesting that Congress meant the
statute to extend to technological protection measures "which require[] the use of a 'key' provided
by a copyriht owner to gain access to a work").
See Landau, supra note 20, at 300-01 (suggesting that traditional entertainment
products such as "[m]usic, film, [and] books" may be analytically indistinguishable from "computer
software" when published in digital form).
216 See, e.g., United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486 (1869) (noting that
statutes should be interpreted to avoid absurd results).
217 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (a)(2).
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readers or courts might attempt to parse this language literally, only to
find themselves stymied by ambiguity. Reasoning from the text alone,
one might get as far as the notion that "effectively controls access" must
mean something different from merely "controls access,"2 '8 otherwise the
word "effectively" becomes superfluous.2 19  But what, then, can
"effectively" mean?22  Perhaps Congress meant to require a certain
minimum strength of access control-that is, perhaps Congress meant to
say to the courts: a technological protection measure must not only
protect access to a work, but must meet some minimal standard of
efficacy in doing so; a trivial cipher will not suffice.21 But the text might
equally well support another reading, one that would preclude inquiry
into the strength of an access control measure. Congress might have
feared, for instance, that courts would interpret the word "control" as
requiring absolute control, and added the word "effectively" as a way to
signal that something less was required. That is, Congress might have
meant the word "effectively" to mean something like "approximately" or
"in general." '222 Having identified this potential ambiguity in the statutory
text, the reader might consult the definition to see what Congress actually
intended.
The definition, however, turns out in reality to be an anti-
definition. It obfuscates, rather than clarifies, the meaning of the term it
purports to define:
[A] technological measure "effectively controls access to a work" if the
measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of
information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright
owner, to gain access to the work.2 23
Absolutely nothing in this text speaks to the question whether the word
"effectively" is meant to connote strength or its absence. Moreover, the
definitional provision compounds the ambiguity of the rest of the text by
introducing new concepts-such as "the application of information" and
"the authority of the copyright owner"-that are difficult to anchor in
any ordinary understanding of the terms they purport to define. Is the
copyright owner's authority relevant to an understanding of whether a
DRM mechanism has "effectively" restricted access to a work? Or to
218 See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 547 (6th
Cir. 2004); supra note 144.
219 See supra note 65 and authorities cited (discussing principle of statutory construction
that Congress is presumed to avoid surplusage).
0 Our hypothetical reader may be inclined to look to the WIPO treaties for guidance, but
would surely be stymied by the absence of support there and by the differing approaches taken by
the various nations that have sought to implement the treaties' anti-circumvention mandates. See Urs
Gasser, Legal Frameworks and Technological Protection of Digital Content: Moving Forward
Towards a Best Practice Model, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 39, 69-71 (2006).
221 Cf supra note 144 and accompanying text.
222 Cf supra note 47 and accompanying text.
223 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B).
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whether the mechanism "controls" access to the work? Or to whether
what is controlled amounts to "access" rather than something else? It is
no easy task to shoehorn this definition into the statutory phrase meant to
embody it. Small wonder that the courts find the statute confusing.224
There is, in short, no reason to think that the DMCA is less
amenable to the methods of judicial policymaking that have guided the
development of the rest of copyright law. To the contrary, the DMCA
suffers from some of the same sorts of infirmities that have confirmed
the need for an independent judicial role.
C. Fair Use and Interbranch Partnership
There is precedent for the courts exercising their substantial
policymaking powers in the domain of copyright to craft judge-made
exceptions to liability based on public policy considerations even where
the literal text of the statute seems to require a finding of infringement.
Two features of copyright law in particular support an ongoing judicial
role in recognizing exceptions to liability. First, copyright infringement
is a strict liability offense; there is no requirement in the statute that the
infringer have acted willfully or knowingly,225 or even consciously.226
Even so-called "innocent infringers" fall within the statute's liability
provisions, although they may be liable for reduced statutory damages.227
Second, the statute provides severe penalties for copyright infringement.
A copyright plaintiff who cannot prove a penny of actual injury may
nevertheless receive statutory damage awards that loom extraordinarily
large in many cases: $750 to $30,000 per work infringed, increased to up
to $150,000 per work if the infringement was willful. 28 Many courts
224 See supra notes 141-145 and accompanying text.
225 See, e.g., Fitzgerald Pub. Co., Inc. v. Baylor Pub. Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 1110, 1113 (2d
Cir. 1986) ("intent or knowledge is not an element of infringement"); Pye v. Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476,
481 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[Elven where the defendant believes in good faith that he is not infringing a
copyright, he may be found liable."); Educ. Testing Serv. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D.
Cal. 1999) ("copyright infringement ... is a strict liability tort"). This general rule predates the
Copyright Act of 1976. See Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931)
("Intention to infringe is not essential under the [1909] act.").
There is a separate exception to copyright infringement liability in the statute for
parties who rely in good faith on inaccurate notices of copyright included on the plaintiffs works.
See 17 U.S.C. § 406(a) (2006). This provision does not, however, create a general knowledge
prerequisite to an action for copyright infringement.
226 See, e.g., Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The fact that
infringement is subconscious or innocent does not affect liability.") (quotation marks omitted);
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1971) ("[C]opying need
not be conscious, but may be the result of subconscious memory derived from hearing, seeing or
reading the copyrighted work at some time in the past.") (quotation marks and citations omitted);
Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
("[linfringement of copyright.., is no less so even though subconsciously accomplished.").
227 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006) (permitting reduction in statutory damage award
"where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not
aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright").
228 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l)-(2).
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have applied these provisions strictly even where the resulting award of
damages seems far disproportionate to any plausible claim of actual harm
by the plaintiff.229 The conjunction of strict liability and heavy penalties
makes it all too easy to imagine cases where literal application of the
statute would yield an unjust result, requiring an award of damages far
disproportionate to the defendant's actual culpability.
The courts, however, have played an important role here-
aiming, with at least some success, to sand the rough edges off of
copyright's strict-liability, sanctions-heavy regime. They have done so
by what might at first glance seem to be sheer defiance of Congress,
refusing to find liability even in circumstances where the statute appears
to require it. Nowhere has this been more clear than in the development
of copyright's doctrine of fair use.
The Supreme Court has characterized fair use as a limitation on
copyright holders' exclusive rights when "rigid application of the
copyright statute .. . would stifle the very creativity which that law is
designed to foster."23 Although the fair use doctrine is now recognized
by statute,231 fair use received legislative recognition only after more than
a century of growth as a judge-made copyright exception. The modem
fair use doctrine is commonly traced to Justice Story's 1841 opinion in
Folsom v. Marsh.232 The case was brought by the holder of the copyright
in a twelve-volume biography of President Washington that consisted
predominantly of edited reproductions of Washington's own presidential
papers."' The defendant copied more than three hundred pages of
Washington's records from the plaintiffs books in order to produce his
229 See, e.g., BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889-90 (7th Cir. 2005) (upholding
award of $22,500 based on defendant's download of 30 copyrighted songs from unauthorized file-
sharing service); Judgment in a Civil Case, Virgin Records America, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06-1497
MJD/RLE (D. Minn. Oct. 5, 2007) (entering judgment for $222,000 based on defendant's making 24
copyrighted songs available on unauthorized file-sharing service). But see Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Thomas, 2008 WL 4405282 at *16-17 (D. Minn. Sept. 24, 2008) (vacating file-sharing judgment and
ordering new trial on grounds that jury instructions failed to require proof of actual distribution).
230 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990). By forbidding copyright holders to
restrict certain forms of speech that build upon their own prior works, the fair use doctrine also
promotes First Amendment values. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003).
231 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . .. is not an
infringement of copyright.").
232 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); see, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (citing Folsom v. Marsh); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985) (same); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 475 n.27 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (same). For an entertaining review of the
Folsom v. Marsh litigation and the decision's place in the history of copyright, see R. Anthony
Reese, The Story of Folsom v. Marsh: Distinguishing Between Infringing and Legitimate Uses, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 259 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
A more skeptical view is available in L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 431, 431 (1998) (finding Folsom v. Marsh to be "so poorly reasoned that it may be entitled
to first place in the category of bad copyright decisions").
233 See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345 ("The other eleven volumes consist of the letters of
Washington, private and official, and his messages and other public acts, with explanatory notes and
occasional illustrations by the editor.").
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own two-volume biography of Washington.2 Justice Story found that
both Washington's private 3 and public correspondence23 6 were covered
by copyright. Justice Story, although "not without some regret, ' 237 came
to the conclusion that the defendant had simply taken too much of the
plaintiff's work, and issued a permanent injunction against the
publication or sale of the defendant's two-volume Washington
biography." He based this decision on the likelihood that the
defendant's work would dampen market demand for the plaintiff's work
by supplying an effective substitute:
If so much is taken, that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the
labors of the original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated
by another, that is sufficient, in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro
tanto.... In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.239
234 Id.; see also id. at 348 ("[I]t cannot be doubted, that these letters are the most
instructive, useful and interesting to be found in [plaintiffs] large collection.").
235 See id. at 345-47. Although recognizing uncertainty in the law regarding the copyright
status of private correspondence, id. at 346, Justice Story found persuasive a line of English
authorities recognizing the author's copyright, subject to a limited publication right held by the
addressee. See id. at 346-47. The question of copyrightability vel non would not, of course, arise
under the present state of copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) ("Copyright protection
subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression ...."); see
also Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1987) (recognizing author's
copyright in private correspondence).
236 See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 347. Justice Story's discussion of the copyright status of
Washington's public correspondence was comparatively cursory in view of his finding that "of the
letters and documents published by the defendants, not more than one fifth part are of an official
character." Id. He reasoned, in essence, that the copyright status of private correspondence extended
by analogy to public correspondence as well, subject to a colorable publication right in favor of the
government. See id. The uncertainty surrounding the copyright status of Presidential documents has
only partly abated since Story's time. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006) (denying copyright
protection to "any work of the United States Government") with 44 U.S.C. § 2202 (2001) (granting
to the Government "complete ownership, possession, and control of Presidential records") and Exec.
Order No. 13,233, § 3(d)(1), (2), 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025, 56,026-27 (Nov. 1, 2001) (forbidding public
disclosure of records of past Presidential administration except upon the joint consent of both the
former and incumbent Presidents). An informative assessment of the proprietary status of
Presidential papers is available in Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular Government:
The Convergence of Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and Control of
Presidential Records, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 651 (2003).
237 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 349.
238 See id.
239 Id. at 348. Elsewhere in his opinion, Justice Story offered an illustrative example of
the sorts of uses that might pose such a substitution risk:
[N]o one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his
design be really and truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable
criticism. On the other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the most important parts of
the work, with a view, not to criticise, but to supersede the use of the original work, and
substitute the review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a piracy.
Id. at 344-45.
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Enacted more than sixty years after Justice Story's decision in
Folsom v. Marsh, the landmark Copyright Act of 1909 made no mention
of fair use.24 Nevertheless, courts applying the Copyright Act of 1909
continued to recognize circumstances in which a defendant whose
activities amounted to infringement under the literal text of the statute
would nevertheless be excused from liability.24 By no later than the
1940s, the courts were beginning to echo Justice Story's language from
Folsom in determining whether particular acts of copying could be
excused under the fair use doctrine:
Whether a particular use of a copyrighted article, without permission of the
owner, is a fair use, depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and
the court must look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the
quantity and value of material used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, diminish the profits, or supersede the objects of the original
work.242
Fair use was recognized as expressing a judge-made policy against
imposing liability,243 notwithstanding the literal terms of the copyright
statute, where it was believed that imposing liability would disserve
public purposes.2"
240 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. An interim general revision of the
federal copyright statute in 1870 similarly took no account of the emerging judicial doctrine of fair
use. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 85-111, 16 Stat. 198, 212-16. See generally PATRY, supra
note 186, § 1:33 (discussing 1870 statute).
241 It took the courts some years to apply the "fair use" label consistently to actions that
would amount to copyright infringement but for the judge-made exception to liability. See Meredith
Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("Originally fair use
was based on the assumption that the user might copy an insignificant portion of protected material
while freely using unprotected material.") (emphasis and quotation marks omitted). Judge Learned
Hand, in some of the earliest cases, seemed to apply the label "fair use" to any use that was excused
from liability. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936)
(equating fair use with taking only "the theme, or ideas, or the like, of a work, though not its
expression") (quotation marks omitted); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d
Cir. 1930) (equating fair use with de minimis taking and explaining that "the question is whether the
part so taken is substantial, and therefore not a fair use of the copyrighted work") (quotation marks
omitted). Judge Hand's terminology is no longer apt; instead, the idea-expression dichotomy and the
de minimis doctrine provide what we would now recognize as additional, independent defenses to a
claim of infringement that render resort to the doctrine of fair use unnecessary. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (2006) ("In no case does copyright protection ... extend to any idea ...."); Sandoval v.
New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[W]here the unauthorized use of a
copyrighted work is de minimis, no cause of action will lie for copyright infringement, and
determination of a fair use claim is unnecessary."). But see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension
Films, 410 F.3d 792, 798 (6th Cir. 2005) (eliminating de minimis doctrine for digital sampling of
copyrighted sound recordings).
242 Matthews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943); cf. supra
note 239 and accompanying text.
243 See, e.g., Tenn. Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir.
1970) (labeling fair use "a judicial rule of public policy" and "a balance wheel and safety valve for
the copyright system") (quotation marks omitted) (quoting John Schulman, Fair Use and the
Revision of the Copyright Act, 53 IOWA L. REv. 832, 832 (1968)).
244 See Berlin v. E.C. Publications Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964) ("[Clourts in
passing upon particular claims of infringement must occasionally subordinate the copyright holder's
interest in a maximum financial return to the greater public interest in the development of art,
science and industry."); Meredith Corp., 378 F. Supp. at 689 ("The [fair use] doctrine then
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Fair use is a sufficiently settled principle today that it is perhaps
easy to forget the doctrine's origins as a judge-made shield against what
the courts, based on considerations of sound policy, perceived to be the
over-deterrent effects of the copyright statutes as written. The parallels
between the DMCA and the rest of federal copyright law, accordingly,
leave ample room for similar doctrinal developments under the DMCA.
It would be consistent with the substantial policymaking responsibilities
the courts have long exercised under copyright for the courts to identify
countervailing policy considerations militating against DMCA liability in
proper cases. As the example of the fair use doctrine shows, where such
countervailing policy considerations exist, the courts stand on relatively
firm historical ground in declining to impose liability even where the
defendant's conduct appears to fall within the literal prohibitions of the
statute. It would, accordingly, be broadly consistent with the historical
development of federal copyright law and with the courts'
responsibilities as coequal partners in copyright policymaking to develop
a set of rules defining circumstances in which the literal terms of the
DMCA's circumvention and trafficking prohibitions will not be given
effect-to craft, as I have labeled it herein, a doctrine of fair
circumvention.245
IV. TOWARDS FAIR CIRCUMVENTION
If the courts are, as the foregoing analysis suggests, free to
develop their own exceptions to the DMCA's liability provisions, how
should they do so? The courts' present approach-announcing
essentially ad hoc exceptions based upon dubious assertions about what
the statutory text expressly requires-yields perhaps the worst of all
possible worlds. By purporting to rest their decisions upon the statutory
text alone, the courts seem to eschew broader policy considerations
based upon sources that are surely pertinent to a complete understanding
of the DMCA (such as the requirements of the relevant 1996 WIPO
Treaties or the Clinton Administration's 1995 White Paper 46 ) but which
lie outside the statute itself. And by making overbroad or unjustified
statements about what the statutory text alone is perceived to require, the
courts undermine the authority of their own positions-future courts may
simply examine the statute for themselves and discover that it does not
really read as advertised.
developed to permit more than insignificant copying of protected material where such copying was
clearly in the public interest and served the underlying purpose of the Copyright Act.
(emphasis omitted).
245 To reiterate a point stated in the text, I do not mean to imply from my choice of the
label "fair circumvention" that the courts must limit their exercise of policymaking responsibilities
to cases involving the DMCA's circumvention, rather than trafficking, offenses. To the contrary,
copyright principles might as readily be invoked in proper cases to shield a defendant accused of
producinj or distributing tools that can be put to circumventing uses.
46 See supra notes 12, 14-15 and accompanying text.
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The answer is not, it seems to me, for the courts to come to an
agreement on what the literal text of the DMCA really requires. Such
strict formalism is a recipe for circularity, given that the DMCA (no less
than the rest of the copyright statute) includes provisions pointing in
multiple directions. The statute speaks with many voices at once: punish
circumvention, but protect libraries and schools;247 punish trafficking, but
allow computer security and encryption researchers to share their
discoveries;24 "protect[ ] ... [the] right[s] of a copyright owner," but
without "affect[ing] ... fair use."'249 At the end of the day, the statute may
not have a single clear meaning to discover.250
That is not to say, however, that the courts are left without
guidance. To the contrary, just as other copyright doctrines offer
explanatory tools the courts may employ in DMCA cases,25" ' the fair use
doctrine itself gives the courts many analogous concepts upon which a
"fair circumvention" doctrine might rest. The discussion that follows will
begin by assessing what copyright doctrine, including principles of fair
use, might teach future litigants and courts about the proper construction
of the DMCA, then conclude by evaluating possible arguments against
this approach.
A. From Fair Use to Fair Circumvention
The fair use provision of the copyright statute gives the courts a
nonexclusive list of factors to consider in determining whether any
challenged use is fair: "(1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 252
It is not difficult to imagine ways in which these same factors
might be profitably analogized to explain limits on the reach of DMCA
liability under the rubric of "fair circumvention." The second fair use
factor, for example-"the nature of the copyrighted work"--recognizes
that copyright law does not extend exactly the same level of protection to
all works. Rather, as the Supreme Court has explained, "some works are
closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the
consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former
247 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (d) (2006).
248 See id. § 1201(a)(2), (g), (j).
249 See id. § 1201(b), (c)(1).
250 As suggested above, the DMCA's definitional provisions seem to pose particular
challenges to textual formalism. See supra notes 211-224, 141-145 and accompanying text.
251 See supra notes 178-184 and accompanying text.
252 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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works are copied." '253 Copyright protects works lying along a broad
continuum between "creative or instructive" '254 works at one end and
works of comparatively little originality (such as factual compilations) at
the other. 5 The closer a work falls to the creative/expressive end of the
continuum, the stronger the author's claim of entitlement to restrict
subsequent uses of the work, and the less room is available for colorable
claims of fair use. 56 So, too, in the DMCA context, the courts might
usefully differentiate between circumvention aimed at allowing the
circumventer to access and copy a creative, expressive work (such as the
movies at issue in Reimerdes) and circumvention that merely enables
access to less expressive, more utilitarian works (as in Chamberlain and
Lexmark)."7 Just as the fair use doctrine would do relatively little to
defeat a claim of copyright infringement where works closer to the
"core" of copyright protection are copied,258 a doctrine of fair
circumvention would impose comparatively weak limits on the reach of
DMCA liability in similar circumstances.
Risks to intellectual property markets, to take another example,
are readily encompassed within both the first and, especially, the fourth
fair use factors. Here, too, it is analytically useful to distinguish between
cases in which circumvention of a DRM mechanism threatens to provide
a complete substitute for authorized purchases of an expressive work (the
situation in Reimerdes),259 and cases in which circumvention merely
exposes a maker of consumer products to additional marketplace
competition (as in Chamberlain and Lexmark). Copyright protects
holders from certain types of economic injury-principally, those
stemming from substitution of the defendant's copy for the
53 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
254 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (1990).
255 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345-51 (1991)
(explaining minimum level of originality required for copyright protection).
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
257 See, e.g., supra notes 179-184 and accompanying text (explaining how copyright's
functionality doctrine may provide a more robust explanation for the courts' results in Chamberlain
and Lexmark than the courts' stated justifications due to the predominantly utilitarian character of
the works sought to be protected in those cases).
258 But see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50
(1984) (suggesting that fair use doctrine protects even copying of core creative, expressive works in
some circumstances).
259 The weak encryption provided by the CSS system for DVD discs, the subject of the
Reimerdes decision, was readily broken by a teenage computer user. See supra notes 37-40 and
accompanying text. In consequence, unencrypted copies of formerly CSS-protected video content
leaked onto the internet, where they continue to circulate today. See, e.g., Peter Biddle et al., The
Darknet and the Future of Content Protection, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT:
TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 344, 359 (Eberhard Becker et al.
eds., 2003). The DMCA does nothing to prevent such no-longer-encrypted content from circulating
online, although the general remedies for infringement of copyright remain available. See Posting of
Edward Felten to Freedom to Tinker, http://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/dmca-and-disrupting-
darknet (Aug. 17, 2005 01:36 EST) ("Files arrive on the darknet having already been stripped of any
technological protection measures .... And you can't circumvent a TPM that isn't there.").
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plaintiff s2 -but not all economic injuries from copying are redressable
as copyright infringemrnt.261 Settled principles of fair use, again, may
provide a useful guide to courts in developing a doctrine of fair
circumvention under the DMCA.262
Finally, consider the problem of circumvention undertaken for
noninfringing purposes. Suppose I try to spark a discussion among my
Copyright students about the fair use claim at issue in Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc.,263 the infamous Jerry Falwell Campari ad
parody case.264 To place the dispute in its historical context as part of the
long-running feud between the late Reverend Falwell and the publisher
of Hustler magazine, I wish to show my students a one-minute clip from
director Milog Forman's acclaimed motion picture, The People vs. Larry
Flynt,265 which includes a subplot revolving around Flynt's copyright
infringement lawsuit.2" To avoid losing the DVD in my office or leaving
it in the classroom, I wish to extract a one-minute excerpt from the DVD
onto my laptop, which I can then hook up to the classroom projector.267
Copyright law would surely permit this; mine is a paradigmatic fair
use-a minuscule excerpt (third factor) used for nonprofit educational
reasons (first factor) with no likelihood of impairing, and indeed some
prospect of benefiting, the market for sales or exhibitions of authorized
copies of The People vs. Larry Flynt (fourth factor).26
260 See Leval, supra note 254, at 1125; see also supra note 239 and accompanying text.
261 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92 ("[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing
theater review, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the
Copyright Act."); see also supra note 38 (noting cases declaring reverse engineering of computer
software not to be infringing even where the resulting increase in market competition harms the
copyright holder).
262 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(0 (2006) (establishing DMCA safe harbor for the development
of interoperable products in certain circumstances).
263 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986).
264 For a summary of the parties' dispute, see id. at 1149-50. Additional background
information, including the parody advertisement at issue in the case, is available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hustler_.Magazine-v._Falwell.
265 THE PEOPLE VS. LARRY FLYNT (Columbia Pictures Corporation 1996).
266 In the film, as in real life, Falwell reacts to Flynt's tasteless parody of a well-known
advertising campaign for Campari by mass-mailing unauthorized copies of Flynt's advertisement in
a fundraising letter to members of Falwell's own Moral Majority. Id. Sadly, if understandably, the
film soon leaves the copyright issue by the wayside, focusing instead on the First Amendment issues
in the case that ultimately went to the Supreme Court as Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46 (1988). In the real world, the Ninth Circuit, by a 2-1 vote, accepted Falwell's fair use defense to
Flynt's claim for copyright infringement, even though the purpose of Falwell's copying was clearly
(indeed, solely) commercial. Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d at 1152, 1156. The majority gave
substantial weight to the political and social purpose of Falwell's copying, which was aimed, it said,
at "generat[ing] moral outrage." Id. at 1156.
267 For discussions of similar scenarios, highlighting the potential effects of the DMCA in
chilling educational fair uses, see Landau, supra note 20, at 297-98; William W. Fisher & William
McGeveran, The Digital Learning Challenge: Obstacles to Educational Uses of Copyrighted
Material in the Digital Age 23-30 (Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc'y Harv. L. Sch,,
Research Publication No. 2006-09, 2006), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/files/copyright
andeducation.html; Denicola, supra note 11, at 209-10.
268 I am sensitive to the risk that even to articulate a detailed fair use justification for such
a clearly lawful use may be taken as a concession that such a justification is necessary, thereby
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But to copy the excerpt from the DVD, I must bypass CSS-and
that, the Reimerdes opinion warns me sternly, I may not do. 69 When the
filmmakers sue me and my employer for violating the DMCA, what can
we do? The Library of Congress recently provided a DMCA exemption
permitting the extraction of clips from CSS-encrypted DVDs, but it does
not apply to law professors.27° If my employer and I must rely (as the
courts have said we must) solely upon the statutory text of the DMCA,
then our defense is colorable, but hardly bulletproof-according to cases
like Reimerdes, the text of the statute forbids circumvention even for fair
uses, notwithstanding Congress's stated intention to the contrary. The
White Paper and the WIPO Treaties, however, both seem to approve of
circumvention undertaken for such noninfringing purposes.27" ' "Fair
circumvention" would permit the courts in DMCA cases to consult these
outside sources for guidance, ultimately yielding greater doctrinal
consistency between the defenses available to claims for copyright
infringement and for violations of the DMCA.
By citing these examples, I do not mean to suggest that
copyright's fair use doctrine should operate as an outer boundary on the
scope of a permissible fair circumvention defense under the DMCA. My
point is less ambitious--even if the courts do not transplant copyright's
fair use doctrine, root and branch, into the somewhat different soil of the
DMCA,272 it is nevertheless true that existing principles of fair use
provide at least some analytical guidance upon which the courts
profitably may rely as they begin to develop a separate body of "fair
circumvention" jurisprudence.273 What future directions that body of law
ceding "too much legitimacy to what sensible people should recognize as extreme copyright claims."
Rebecca Tushnet, Sight, Sound, and Meaning: Teaching Intellectual Property with Audiovisual
Materials, 52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 891, 903 (2008). I offer the example here only to highlight the
(analytically absurd, in my view) disconnect between conduct that is clearly lawful under copyright,
yet just as clearly punishable under the DMCA as it has hitherto been construed.
269 See supra Part BI.B.l.
270 See 2006 Final Rule, supra note 28. The new exemption allows circumvention of
DRM mechanisms protecting "[a]udiovisual works included in the educational library of a college or
university's film or media studies department, when circumvention is accomplished for the purpose
of making compilations of portions of those works for educational use in the classroom by media
studies or film professors." 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(1) (2007). By its terms, this exemption is too
narrow to allow a law professor to copy an excerpt from his or her personal copy of a copyrighted
motion picture.
271 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
272 See Denicola, supra note 11, at 220-32; Tian, supra note 11, at 779-81.
273 Uncertainty and unpredictability are frequently cited as undesirable characteristics of
contemporary fair use law that preclude the doctrine from being reduced to a set of clearly
established systematic rules and may inhibit users from engaging in uses that, even if they would
ultimately be found lawful, rest upon debatable claims of entitlement to fair use protection. See
Armstrong, supra note 11, at 52, 70-74; see also James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion
in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 890 (2007) (labeling fair use "famously
ambiguous"). This uncertainty stems in part from the case-specific balancing inquiry mandated by
the statute-which, the Supreme Court has warned, "is not to be simplified with bright-line rules."
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). By inviting the courts to draw upon
fair use principles, at least initially, in formulating fair circumvention doctrine, the risk of
multiplying the undesirable traits of unpredictability and uncertainty may seem apparent. Two
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may take are for the courts to say. It is better that they begin to do so
rather than continuing to invoke the fiction that the text of the statute
alone commands their contradictory decisions.
B. Possible Criticisms
The mode of analysis sketched out in the preceding section,
which generally contemplates construing the DMCA in the light of the
broader corpus of copyright law and with particular attention to the fair
use doctrine, might plausibly be attacked as either unduly lax or unduly
confining. Neither objection, it seems to me, ought to obscure its
potential advantages in achieving rationality and coherence of judicial
doctrine under the DMCA.
First, construing the DMCA in light of the broader purposes of
copyright poses no real risk that unchecked judicial activism will thwart
legislative intent. My recommendation is not that the courts make up for
themselves a set of policies and purposes for the DMCA, but rather that
they seek guidance from a comparatively well-developed body of
analytically related copyright jurisprudence. Construing related statutory
texts harmoniously is a familiar exercise well within the courts'
institutional competence.274 And many interpretive theories recognize the
propriety of consulting broader statutory purposes as aids to determine
the meaning of an enacted text.275 Congress spoke in copyright
language276 and was thinking copyright thoughts 77 in the DMCA, and it
related observations, however, may point the way towards mitigating the risk of such doctrinal
indeterminacy. First, to say that fair use doctrine as a whole suffers from an unpredictability
problem, see David Nimmer, "Fairest of Them All" and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2003), is not to say that the outcome of any individual fair use dispute is
necessarily unknowable in advance: some uses are clearly fair. See, e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music
Corp., No. C 07-3783 JF, 2008 WL 3884333, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2008) (dismissing copyright
holder's concerns about unpredictability of fair use); id. ("Undoubtedly, some evaluations of fair use
will be more complicated than others."). Second, as Michael Madison has demonstrated, some of the
putative confusion surrounding the fair use doctrine vanishes upon careful identification of certain
factual commonalities in the courts' decisions. These commonalities may be ascertained in advance
and employed to aid in planning for both litigants and courts, potentially making subsequent case
outcomes more predictable. See Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1525, 1645-65 (2004).
274 See, e.g., supra note 178 and accompanying text.
275 See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 147 (1994) (Judges should resolve
uncertainties in the meaning of statutory text "in the way which best serves the principles and
policies it expresses. If the policy of the specific arrangement is open to doubt, the official should
interpret it in the way which best harmonizes with more basic principles and policies of law.");
ESKRIDGE, supra note 196, at 234-38 (defending, against contemporary formalist critiques, reliance
on legislative history and other extrinsic aids to identify meaning). Other interpretive theories, of
course, would go even further than I am presently suggesting. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUrEs 98 (1982) ("Scholarly criticisms ... , jury actions that
nullify or mitigate past rules, even administrative determinations, all can be appropriate reports of
change in the landscape" that courts should be permitted at least to consider.).
276 See supra notes 166-172 and accompanying text.
277 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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would hardly represent judicial usurpation of lawmaking authority for
the courts to construe the statute consistently with its background.
The objection from the opposite direction would be that
construing the DMCA as a part of the broader corpus of copyright law
threatens, rather than protects, the public's interest in access to
expressive works, in view of the generally pro-plaintiff orientation of the
courts in copyright cases.278 I readily concede that the conception of
copyright as predominantly a vehicle for advancing public ends, although
firmly grounded in the text of the Constitution,279 has met with a chillier
reception from the courts in recent decades.28 But it has hardly
disappeared from the landscape. Courts and commentators alike continue
to speak of copyright's value in promoting broader public ends involving
the availability of expressive works, not merely as a mechanism for
transferring wealth from the public to copyright holders.281 And the scope
of protections available under copyright law for the public interest, even
under a restrictive view, surely compare favorably with the most
restrictive current interpretations of the DMCA. Analogizing from the
latter to the former, accordingly, ought to pose no serious risk of
contracting, and some possibility of enlarging, the sphere of viable public
uses of digital copyrighted works.
V. CONCLUSION
The institutional response of the courts to the enactment of the
DMCA has been puzzling. Federal copyright law has long developed as
an exercise in interbranch partnership, with Congress and the courts
generally acting as coequal partners in the development of doctrine. The
courts have played particularly important roles in limiting the potentially
undesirable reach of copyright's liability and penalty provisions, which
might readily threaten other expressive values if applied strictly as
written. Under the DMCA, in contrast, the courts seem to have ceded a
278 See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 92, at 441 (lamenting chilling effects created by
restrictive judicial interpretations of fair use).
279 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the
Progress of Science ... by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their ...
Writings. ... ) (emphasis added). Recent historical scholarship identifies the "promotion of
progress" as a substantive objective that the Framers intended as a constraint upon legislative
authority. See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress
as a Limitation on Congress's Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2006).
280 Compare Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
("[P]rivate motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts."), with Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003)
("[C]opyright law serves public ends by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private
ones.").
281 See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20 (observing that copyright law, including the
exceptions to copyright holders' exclusive rights, is intended to promote dissemination of expressive
works); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REv.
1137, 1150 (1990) ("Fair use does not exclude consideration of factors not related to the utilitarian
justification for copyright--other social values or, more simply, fairness.").
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good deal of their historical policymaking role in copyright matters back
to Congress. Both the cases construing the DMCA broadly and the cases
construing it narrowly have attempted to portray their results as resting
not upon policy considerations, but instead as commanded solely, or
primarily, by the literal text of the statute. In doing so, the courts have at
once demoted themselves from the coequal policymaking role they have
traditionally occupied in copyright and imposed on the text of the DMCA
a far greater burden than it can colorably bear, for like other copyright statutes,
the DMCA includes a multiplicity of provisions pointing in different directions.
The effect has been a devaluing of copyright doctrine in cases
under the DMCA to no identifiable benefit. The development of a
cohesive body of DMCA case law is hampered by the courts' insistence
on disregarding provisions that actually appear in the statute. Doing so
both diminishes the persuasive force of their decisions (for later courts
may decide instead to emphasize the provisions of the DMCA that the
earlier courts discounted) and inhibits consideration of plainly relevant
source materials outside the enacted text. Copyright law, for its own
valid purposes, long ago outgrew such strict formalism. It would be far
preferable for the courts in DMCA cases to do likewise.
Perhaps they have. After all, cases like Chamberlain and
Lexmark do seem to draw upon matters of legislative policy and intent to
give the DMCA quite a different reading than did cases like Reimerdes.
Perhaps the courts are silently thinking "fair circumvention" thoughts,
while outwardly preserving a faqade of formalist orthodoxy to forestall
intervention by a more narrowly textualist Supreme Court. If that is their
game, however, it seems hardly to be worth the candle. A court's
insistence in case #1 that the literal text of the DMCA says something it
clearly does not leaves all the parties in case #2 worse off, for they must
either frame their own arguments around the supposed literal text of the
statute (a recipe for continued confusion) or invoke policy considerations
outside the statutory text that precedent has declared to be irrelevant.
Development of a rational, cohesive body of doctrine under the
DMCA would be served far more readily by a forthright judicial
declaration that, although particular conduct might be encompassed within
the four comers of the statute's liability provisions, it nevertheless will
not be punishable for good and adequate reasons of policy. Debate thereafter
could revolve around ascertaining the reasonable limits of those policies
and any countervailing principles (prominently including, to be sure,
fidelity to the intent of Congress and the enacted text where it supplies an
ascertainable rule of decision). This is the route the courts took when developing
copyright's fair use doctrine, and it remains a sensible alternative for
developing a "fair circumvention" doctrine under the DMCA.
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